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Abstract

In 1993, there were an estimated two million hosts connected to the Internet with a user population of around twenty million, in seventy countries.
Increasingly, the information being transmitted within the Internet community is sensitive and concerns about data privacy and integrity are growing.
This thesis examines the internet environment and the issues that have lead
to this raised level of concern regarding security. We will also examine some
of the primitive cryptographic services that are available to promote trust
between users.

'

It is universally acknowledged that reliable authentication of communicating
entities is essential for achieving security in a distributed computing environment. The design of such systems as Kerberos, SPX and more recently
KryptoKnight and Kuperee, have largely been successful in addressing the
problem. We will examine two of these systems. The first, Kerberos is the
best known of these efforts and was developed at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) as part of Project Athena. It is based on the weU-known
Needham and Schroeder protocol and incorporates modifications that were
proposed by Denning and Sacco. The second, KryptoKnight, is more recent.
Unlike Kerberos which uses timestamps to ensure freshness, KryptoKnight
relies on exchange of nonces. The common element within these implementations is the need for a trusted third-party authentication service. This
essentially, requires a great deal of trust to be invested in the authentication
server which adds a level of complexity and reduces system flexibility.

The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties was
first suggested by M. Rabin in "Transactions protected by beacons," Journal
of Computer and System Sciences, Vol 27, pp 256-267,1983. In this thesis we
revive Rabin's ideas which have been largely overlooked in the psist decade.
In particular we present a novel approach to the authentication problem
bcLsed on a service called Beacon which continuously broadccists certified
nonces. We show that tliis approach considerably simplifies authentication
and the distribution of keys. We illustrate the impact of such a service
by "Beaconizing" the Needham and Schroeder public key protocol.

The

modified protocol would be suitable for deployment at upper layers of the
communication protocol stack.

The results of this thesis are to be pubhshed in:
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Beacon based authentication. In Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
ORICS'94),

Brighton,

Notes in Computer

(ES-

UK, Nov 1994, accepted for publication by Lecture

Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York,

1994.
A less technical version of the paper is to be presented at:
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Network security featuring beacon based
authentication. In Proceedings of Fifth Australasian

Conference on Infor-

mation Systems, Melbourne, Australia, Sept 1994, accepted for publication.

ui

Publication Arising from this Thesis
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Beacon based authentication. In Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'94), Brighton, UK, Nov 1994, accepted for publication by

Lecture

Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York,
1994.
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Network security featuring beacon based
authentication. In Proceedings of Fifth Australasian Conference on Information Systems, Melbourne, Australia, Sept 1994, accepted for publication.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I wish to thank Professor Jennifer Seberry for her help,
advice, support and encouragement. I thank Dr. Yuliang Zheng for help
and support.

I would also like to thank Dr. Thomas Hardjono for his

interest, support and suggestions. Finally, I thank all the members of the
Center for Computer Security Research for creating such a plesisant research
environment.
This work has been supported in part by the Australian Research Council
(ARC) under the reference numbers A49232172, A49130102, A49131885 and
the University of WoUongong Computer Security Technical and Social Issues
research program.

Contents

1

Introduction

1

1

2

3

The Internet

7

2.1

The Internet

7

2.2

A Brief History of the Internet

8

2.3

Internet Security

12

The internet Protocol Suite

13

3.1

An Overview of internet Environment

14

3.1.1

Brief History

14

3.1.2

Basic Structure

15

3.2

3.3

Datahnk Layer

17

3.2.1

18

Ethernet

Network Layer

20

3.4

3.5

4

3.3.1

Address Resolution Protocol

21

3.3.2

Internet Protocol

24

3.3.3

Internet Control Message Protocol

31

3.3.4

Reverse Address Resolution Protocol

.

32

Transport Layer

33

3.4.1

User Datagram Protocol

34

3.4.2

Transmission Control Protocol

.

Applications

34
35

3.5.1

TELNET

35

3.5.2

File Transfer Protocol

36

3.5.3

Remote Commands

36

A Look at internet Protocol Suite Security

39

4.1

The Adversary

40

4.2

Address Based Authentication

42

4.3

Source Route Attack

43

4.4

Routine Information Protocol Attack

45

4.5

ICMP Vulnerabilities

47

*4.5.1

Redirect Message

48

vni

4.5.2
4.6

5

6

Destination Unreachable Message

T C P Sequence Number Prediction Attack

50
50

Communication Security

53

5.1

Communication Security

54

5.2

Security Services

55

5.3

Delivery of Security Services

56

5.4

Security Mechanisms

58

5.4.1

Encryption

59

5.4.2

Authentication

60

5.4.3

Manipulation Detection Code

61

Authentication and Key Distribution Systems

63

6.1

Principals and Realms

64

6.2

Kerberos

66

6.2.1

Pre-authentication

66

6.2.2

Obtaining Service Credentials

68

6.2.3

Credentials

71

6.2.4

Limitations

72

6.3

KryptoKnight

74

7

6.3.1

KryptoKnight Encryption Method

75

6.3.2

KryptoKnight Ticket

76

6.3.3

Single Sign-On

78

6.3.4

Obtaining Service

80

6.3.5

Observations on KryptoKnight

83

Beacons

85

7.1

86

Rabin's Approach Using Beacons
<

7.2

8

7.1.1

The Contract Signing Problem

86

7.1.2

Contract Signing Using a Beacon

87

Beacons for Secure Communication

90

7.2.1

Token

90

7.2.2

Network Synchronization

91

7.2.3

Creating a Beacon

92

7.2.4

One-time Token

94

Beaconizing the N e e d h a m and Schroeder Protocol

97

8.1

Needham and Schroeder Protocol

98

8.2

Protocol Weakness

101

»

8.3

Denning and Sacco's Modification

. 102

9

8.4

A Beacon Based Approach

105

8.5

Attacks on the Modified Protocol

108

8.6

Discussion of Advantages

Ill

Concluding Remarks

113

9.1

Summary

113

9.2

Future Considerations

115

9.2.1

115

Inter-Reahn Support

1

9.2.2

Identity Based Cryptographic Schemes

116

9.2.3

Implementation of a Secure Systems

116

A Beacon Based Authentication

119

B Network Security Featuring Beacon Based Authentication 137

Xll

Chapter 1

Introduction

In the past thirty years, the rapid growth in the use of electronic data communication has been quite spectacular. There can be very few aspects of
daily life that have not been transformed by this so called revolution. Much
of the data routinely transmitted is sensitive either for reasons concerning
individual privacy or commercial confidentiality. Justifiably, there is a growing apprehension about data secrecy and integrity. If we hved in a trustworthy society, where no individual stole or misused information, data security
would not be an issue. Alas that is not the case.

The largest single collection of computer networks is referred to as the Internet. Today there are an estimated twenty million users who use the Internet
in seventy countries. The Internet is currently used to carry data from a
variety of sources including research organizations, government bodies and
business. As time passes more and more of the information being transmit-
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ted is sensitive.
With such a large user base, it is hardly surprising that one or two "bad
apples" have found their way into this world wide community. Their efforts
have not gone unnoticed.

Clifford StoU's book "The Cuckoo's Egg" [41

describes the activities of the so-called Hanover Hacker.

Robert Morris'

rogue worm program [39, 35] received wide media publicity.

In October

1989, the worm program Worms Against Nuclear Killers (WANK) infected
a NASA network [7].
Very little in the way of security services currently exist within the. most
used implementations of the communication protocols used for within the
Internet. This makes the Internet itself vulnerable to various types of attacks. There is no systematic provision for protecting the confidentiality of
user communications and in many cases it is comparatively easy for intruders
to intercept, understand, alter communications, or even originate forgeries.
Since there is no standard effective method for the authentication of network
principals, the Internet provides an excellent vehicle for allowing criminals
to remain anonymous while committing theft or acts of vandalism.
In this thesis we shall be concerned with the provision of security services
for an internet environment. We examine some of the security issues being
universally expressed and explore various solutions. This thesis is laid out
in the following manner:

• Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to the Internet and provides

a glimpse into the types of issues and concerns that are being expressed
within the community.

• C h a p t e r 3 introduces the internet protocol suite which provides the
means for the Internet to function.

Currently (1994), the internet

protocol suite is the most widely implemented, non-vendor specific
protocol. The discussion within this chapter omits much of the the
technical information and limits itself to the minimum that is required
to understand the internet environment.

• C h a p t e r 4 is concerned with the security issues that are related to'the
internet protocol suite. The approach taken is to keep the discussion
informal. This chapter aims to give the reader a flavour of the issues
involved by examining some of the "holes" that have been found.

• In C h a p t e r 5 the discussion focuses on the primitive mechanisms and
services that are available to provide security services.

• C h a p t e r 6 describes two very well-known Authentication and Key
Distribution systems. The first of these called Kerberos, was designed
for and is currently used by, a number of internet environments. The
second, KryptoKnight, is a more recent development and wiU probably
gain more prominence in the future.

• C h a p t e r 7 is the result of original research carried out by myself.
Professor Seberry, and Dr. Zheng. We introduce a new security service
called Beacon which will simplify authentication and key distribution.
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This novel approach has been inspired by the work carried out M.
Rabin in 1983. These ideas presented by Rabin have been largely
overlooked by the research community during the past decade. We
describe Rabin's ideas before modifying them so that the Beacon may
be used to provide a new security service for communicating principals.

• Chapter 8, which is my own, illustrates the advantage of a beacon based approach by "beaconizing" the well-known Needham and
Schroeder protocol. The discussion begins by briefly outline the Needham and Schroeder protocol using asymmetric keys. Next, the weaki

ness pointed out by Denning and Sacco and their solution to the
problem is described. Finally, the Needham and Schroeder protocol
is modified to take advantage of a Beacon. The chapter shows that the
modified protocol simplifies authentication and key distribution and
has advantages over both the Needham and Schroeder protocol and
modified protocol suggested by Denning and Sacco.
• Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by describing future work.
• Appendix A contains the paper:
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Beacon based authentication. In
Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'94),

Brighton, UK, Nov 1994, accepted for pubUca-

tion by Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, BerlinHeidelberg-New York, 1994.

ESORICS'94 report a one third acceptance rate.
• Appendix B contains the less technical paper featuring a Beacon.
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Network security featuring beacon
based authentication. In Proceedings of Fifth Australasian Conference
on Information Systems, Melbourne, Australia, Sept 1994, accepted
for publication.
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Chapter 2

The Internet

In the past decade, the rapid evolution of electronic data communication
using the Internet has been breath taking.

This growth and reliance on

electronic communication has increased concern about data privacy and integrity. Much effort is currently being devoted to providing security services
for a variety of internet communication environments. In this chapter we
give a brief overview of the Internet and the security concerns that are being
expressed universally.

2.1

The Internet

The Internet is a complex worldwide web of individual computer networks
which connects hosts in seventy countries.

All hosts within the Internet

(upper-case " I " ) use a set of protocols called the internet (all lower case)
protocol suite. Topographically, the Internet consists of a set of large net-
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works which are interconnected. These upper-level networks are made of an
interconnection of smaller networks, which in turn are made up of subnetworks and so on. Hosts on the Internet are able to communicate over vast
physical distances by resolving addresses in this hierarchical fashion.
A survey conducted in July 1991 [21] by SRI International Network Information Center estimated the number of hosts that were directly connected
to the Internet. Their findings placed the number of hosts at some 535,000
in 16,000 domains (a network that as an Internet address). The largest ten
upper-level domains are listed in Table 2.1.
By 1993, the number of hosts connected to the Internet had jumped to
over 2 million [18] with an estimated user population of 20 million. That
is, currently in 1994, there are over twenty million people in some seventy
countries that can be contacted directly within a few seconds. New users are
estimated to be joining the Internet community at between 15 to 20 percent
per month.

2.2

A Brief History of the Internet

Since the invention of the computer, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has been one of the largest purchasers in the world. In the
sixties there was a growing realization that communications between diverse
computer hardware, from multiple vendors, was a major problem. In the late
sixties the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), now called DARPA

2.2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE

INTERNET

Name

Description

EDU

Education

206,000

COM

Commercial

144,000

GOV

Government

36,000

MIL

Military

26,000

AU

Australia

22,000

DE

Germany

21,000

CA

Canada

19,000

ORG

Organization

15,000

SE

Sweden

12,000

CH

Switzerland

10,000

Number of Hosts

Table 2.1: 1991 SRI survey - Ten Largest Domains
(Defense ARPA), began funding research into computerized communications
and networking.
Work on the ARPANet [34], which grew into what we know as the Internet,
began in 1969. The ARPANet, when first proposed, was staggering in its
boldness. For instance, it proposed the use of leased lines to communicate
at rates of 50 kilobits per second. Network communication over long distances using such high bandwidths was unheard of at that time. ARPANet
became an important test-bed for pioneering research into packet switching
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technology and computer inter-operability. In tlie following decade, the 70s,
many protocols and architectures were discussed and prototyped. Much of
the success of the Internet is due to this early work.
What we now call the Internet began life in 1980 when most of the work
on architecture and protocols was completed. The new protocol suite, the
internet protocol suite, was adopted by the DoD which began the process
of converting all its computers connected to ARPANet to the new technology. The transition was completed in 1983 when the Secretary of Defense
mandated that all DoD computers connected to its long-haul networks must
i
use the internet protocol suite. This in effect tied machines connected to
ARPANet, which eventually became the Internet, to this set of protocols.
Also in 1983, the military computers were split from ARPANet to form a
new network caUed MILNet, leaving ARPANet to be a network dominated
by the research community.
In 1984, the DoD adopted a set of protocol standards to be used by the
military which were very closely based on the work funded by the ARPA.
The standards include the following protocols [3]:

• Internet Protocol (IP). A connectionless service to communicate across
networks. The service does not guarantee reliable delivery (MIL-STD1777).

• Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). A reliable end-to-end service
for transferring data (MIL-STD-1778).

2.2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET
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• File Transfer Protocol ( F T P ) . A simple application protocol for transferring files. (MIL-STD-1780).

• Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). A simple electronic mail protocol (MIL-STD-1781).

• T E L N E T Protocol. A simple virtual terminal protocol. (MIL-STD1782).

Although the actual internet protocol suite consists of several other protocols, the five above are the only ones officially adopted by the DoD as
standards. This adoption was probably responsible for the term " T C P / I P "
which is commonly used to refer to the internet protocol suite.
To encourage acceptance of its protocol standard, the ARPA began the task
of coaxing universities and research institutes to adopt the internet protocol
suite. A key spoke in its strategy, and one which had a profound effect on
the evolution of the Internet, was to fund the implementation of the internet
protocol suite under Unix. The ARPA granted the University of Berkeley
the task of integrating these protocols into the university's Berkeley Software
Distribution (BSD Unix). During this period a large number of university
computer science departments were running some variant of Berkeley Unix.
W h a t ' s more, many of these departments were in the process of installing local area networks (LANs) and the lack of alternatives made the new protocol
suite very attractive.

3 0009 03132053 9

12

2.3

CHAPTER 2. THE

INTERNET

Internet Security

The initial project on the protocols and architecture was sponsored by the
ARPA to demonstrate the feasibility of long-haul packet switching technology. In the two decades that followed, during which the Internet took shape,
security was not the primary concern. Greater emphasis was placed on issues
such as efficiency and inter-operability. As a result very little in the way of
security services currently exist within widely used implementations of the
protocol suite.
Today there are an estimated twenty miUion users who use the Internet
in seventy countries. Internet is currently used to carry data from a variety of sources including research organizations, government bodies and
business. Increasingly, the information being transmitted is sensitive and
concerns about data privacy and integrity are growing. During 1993 the
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) received 1334 reports of security breaches. The FBI estimates.that 80 to 90 percent of computer crimes
it investigates use the Internet to gain access to the computer system [18].
Hence the proposal and implementation of security protocols which are feasible and practical for the Internet is a pressing and growing area of research.

Chapter 3

The internet Protocol Suite
The term " T C P / I P " is commonly misused to refer to the collection of protocols which together provide end-to-end communications in an internet environment. This common reference is derived from two specific protocols
which are included in the protocol suite, the Transmission Control Protocol
( T C P ) and the Internet Protocol (IP). A more correct term for this collection
of protocols would the internet (all lower case) protocol suite.

The internet protocol suite was designed to allow hosts connected to different
network types to communicate with one another. The suite currently exist in
a number of networking environments including local area networks (LANs),
land-based long haul networks and mobile radio networks.

The internet

protocol suite at present is the most widely implemented and used, nonvendor specific protocol. It is the basis by which Internet operates.
This chapter gives a brief description of the internet protocol suite.

The
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discussion omits a great deal of the technical information and is limited to
the minimum that is required to understand the internet environment. For
a detailed description, the reader is encouraged read the following references
[9, 10, 38].

3.1
3.1.1

A n Overview of internet Environment
Brief History

The development of the internet protocols was sponsored by the United
States Department of Defense (DoD) under the Advance Research Project
Agency (ARPA). The projects purpose was to demonstrate the feasibility of
long-haul packet switching technology. The following are the milestones in
the development of the internet protocol suite.
(

• 1969. ARPA initiated a research and development project to build a
four nodes wide area network to be called ARPANet. The four nodes
were to be located at the University of California at Santa Barbara
(UCSB), the University of CaUfornia at Los Angles (UCLA), SRI International and Systems Development Corporate.
• 1972. ARPANet was publicly demonstrated in order to prove the feasibility of long-haul packet switching technology. ARPANet consisted
of approximately twenty packet switchers and fifty hosts.

3.1. AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNET
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• mid 70's. Work toward internet protocol suite continued. Research
centres work on the protocol architectures extended to include researchers in other countries. TCP prototype is implemented at various
centres.
• 1979. Work on the internet suite architecture was by-and-large complete and had taken it current form.
• 1980. ARPRA began the task of converting all its research computers
to the new protocol suite. The work was completed in 1983.
i

• 1983. The new internet protocol was adopted as the new US military
standard. The military network MILNet splits from ARPANet. Commercial companies embraced the new standard. The new standard was
incorporated into Berkeley Unix.

3.1.2

Basic Structure

The protocols that make up the internet protocol suite can be placed in a
four layer stack: Application Layer; Transport Layer; Network Layer and
Datalink Layer. Figure 3.1 illustrates this.
This logical structure of the layered protocols enables computers to communicate and determine the message sequence. For useful communication to
take place, applications that are on two physically separated hosts, must be
able to communicate. Within the internet protocol suite an application receives data from, and transmits data to, the Transport layer. The two most

CHAPTER
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internet PROTOCOLS
APPLICATION

TELNET

FTP

SMTP

SUITE

ISO/OSI MODEL
OTHERS

DNS

LEVELS 6 AND 7

LEVELS
OTHERS

UDP

TCP

TRANSPORT

LEVEL4

ICMP

NETWORK

LEVELS

IP
RARP

ARP

DATA LINK

IEEE 802.3
ETHERNET

IEEE 802.4
TOKEN BUS

IEEE 802.5

X.25

OTHERS

LEVEL 2

TOKEN RING

Figure 3.1: The internet Protocol Stack
commonly used transportation mechanisms are: TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram Protocol). The difference between
the two is covered later in this chapter. For an application that uses TCP,
such as FTP (File Transfer Protocol), data passes between the application
and the TCP module. Alternatively, some applications are designed to use
UDP as the transportation service. SNMP (Simple Network Management
Protocol) is probably the best known application that uses UDP.
In a similar fashion, the Transport layer exchanges data with the Network
layer which in turn exchanges data with the Datalink layer. We can thus
summarize the dataflow between two application, such as FTP, in Figure 3.2.

3.2.

DATALINK

LAYER
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FTP

FTP

TCP

TCP

t
IP

f
t

IP

i
ETHERNET

1

\

ETHERNET

1\

Figure 3.2: Communication Between to FTP Applications

3.2

Datalink Layer

A key feature of the internet protocol stack is that each layer within the
hierarchy hides the details of the layer underneath from the layer above.
In the case of the Datalink layer, IP hides the working of the particular
Datalink layer driver used from the Transport layer protocols.

This has

the advantage that if there is an advance in network technology, it can be
incorporated into the internet stack by implementing a new driver. The new
driver which would be part of the Datalink layer would communicate with
the IP module in a weU defined manner. Thus allowing networks to evolve
by taking advantage of the advances with a minimum of change to the stack.
Datalink layer modules can be divided into two broad categories; those which
provide Local Area Network (LAN) services and those that provide Wide
Area Network (WAN) services. The Datalink layer within LANs are designed
to basically provide a service where discrete pieces of data are passed between

18

CHAPTER 3. THE INTERNET

PROTOCOL

SUITE

participating hosts. Tliese hosts are directly connected to the same LAN.
Cooperation between peer Datalink modules is limited aside from this basic
service and data transmitted at this level within a LAN undergoes little
processing other then error detection and correction.
Datalink services in WANs such as the private ARPANet and X.25 are more
comprehensive. Hosts in these types of networks can be thought of as being
attached by point-to-point links. Packet switching nodes, also called gateways or routers, act in conjunction with one another to provide store and
forward processing of data frames. WANs often attempt to provide reliable
packet delivery which makes the service provided by the Datalink layer far
more complicated.
A great deal of work has been done to make the internet protocol suite available on the widest variety of networking environments possible. To keep the
discussion simple, this chapter will provide a very simple description of the
Datalink layer services provided by one type of LAN, the Ethernet. Ethernet
has become a very widely used LAN technology within the Internet community. Figure 3.3 illustrates the network that will be used to demonstrate
various concepts. For simplicity it will be assumed that the open network is
some generic WAN.

3.2.1

Ethernet

Within the internet stack, a unit of data is named according to the protocol it
has reached. That is, as data travel down the stack, the name by which they

3.2. DATALINK LAYER
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BOTjj^EBRUSH

WARATAH

WOLLONGONG
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Figure 3.3: internet Network
are referred to changes. Within Ethernet the data are called an Ethernet
frame. Once the data are passed up to the IP module they are referred to
as an IP packet.
An Ethernet frame contains the destination address, source address, type
field, and the IP packet which contains the message. An Ethernet address
is six octets in length. Every device has its own Ethernet address and listens for Ethernet frames with that destination address.

All devices also

listen for Ethernet frames for a destination address FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF
(in hexadecimal), which is called the broadcast address.
Ethernet uses CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense and Multiple Access with Collision

20
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CSMA/CD means that aU devices communicate on a single

medium over which only one can transmit at a given time, however all hosts
can receive simultaneously. If two hosts try to transmit at the same instant,
the collision is detected, and both hosts wait a short random period before
attempting to re-transmit. Since both hosts calculate their random period
independently, there is overwhelming probability that the same collision will
not re-occur.

3.3

Network Layer

t

The IP module is central to the success of internet technology. The primary
task of the IP protocols is to provide end-to-end packet delivery between
hosts on separate networks. To accomplish this, the IP addressing permits
hosts to be identified by both network number and host number.

Thus

building a single logical network from multiple physical networks. This interconnection of physical networks has provided the protocol suite its name:
internet.

In addition the Network layer also provides fragmentation and

reassembly of IP packets so that any size limitation placed by the individual Datalink services can be overcome. This allows large IP datagrams to
navigate various network technologies between physically separated hosts.
The main functionality provided by the Network layer are contained in four
protocols as illustrated in Figure 3.1.

3.3.

NETWORK

LAYER
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IP Address

Ethernet Address

192.1.1.1

08-00-39-76-2F-CB

192.1.1.2

08-00-4A-21-A7-25

192.1.1.4

08-00-A0-19-AC-84

Table 3.1: Example ARP Table
3.3.1

Address Resolution Protocol

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is part of the Network layer and is used
to resolve host addresses. To keep the discussion simple we assume that the
under lying network is an Ethernet.

A R P Table for Address Translation

Address translations are performed using a look-up table (see Table 3.1)
called the ARP table which is stored in memory and contains a row for each
known host. There is a column for IP addresses and a column for Ethernet
addresses. When translating an IP address to an Ethernet address, the table
is searched for a matching IP address.
The convention for expressing the four octet IP address is to write each octet
as a decimal number and the four numbers which are separated by a fuUstop. The six octet Ethernet address, by convention, has each octet written
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in hexadecimal form and separated by either a minus sign or a colon.
The ARP table is necessary because the IP addresses and Ethernet addresses
are independent. That is, an algorithm cannot be used to translate an IP
address to an Ethernet address. The IP address is selected by the network
administrator based on the location of the computer on the network. When
the computer is moved to a different location, its IP address may be changed
to correspond. An Ethernet address is selected by the manufacturer based
on the Ethernet address space licensed by the manufacturer.

When the

Ethernet interface board changes, the Ethernet address changes.
K

During normal operation, a network application such as FTP, sends a message to TCP for delivery. The message of course contains the name of the
intended message recipient. In turn TCP sends a corresponding T C P message to the IP module. The destination address is known to the IP module
as it has been passed down from the application and the A R P table is used
to look-up the destination Ethernet address. Once the Ethernet address is
known, an IP packet can be constructed and is given to the Ethernet driver
together with the destination Ethernet address.

ARP Request/Response Pair

ARP messages are used in the event that an application requests a message
be delivered to a host whose Ethernet address is not known. That is, the
translation is missing from the ARP table. The ARP Request/Response
protocol is used to find the missing address and quickly update the table.
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Source

Target

IP Address

192.1.1.1

192.1.1.3

Ethernet Address

08-00-39-76-2F-CB

< blank >

Table 3.2: ARP Request Summarized
To accomplish this, the following five steps are taken:

1. The outgoing IP request is queued.

This enables the packet to be

processed after the table is updated.

2. An ARP request packet containing the IP address which requires a
corresponding Ethernet address, is broadcast to aU hosts connected to
the local network. Every computer's Ethernet driver receives the frame
and once the type field is examined, the request is passed up to the
ARP module. The ARP request packet is summarized in Table 3.2.

3. Each ARP module examines the Target IP address contained in the
broadcast request and if it matches its own IP address, a response is
sent to the Source Ethernet Address. An ARP response packet has
the source and target fields swapped as shown in Table 3.3.

4. The response is received by the original sender. The Ethernet driver
looks at the type field in the Ethernet frame and passes the ARP
response to the ARP module. The ARP module examines the ARP
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Source

Target

IP Address

192.1.1.3

192.1.1.1

Ethernet Address

08-00-28-10-28-A5

08-00-39-76-2F-CB

Table 3.3: ARP Response Summarized
packet and adds the sender's IP and Ethernet addresses to its ARP
table.

,

,

5. The new translation having been installed, the request which was
queued (step 1), can be processed. The IP address to Ethernet address translation is performed and the Ethernet frame is transmitted.

Each computer has a separate ARP table for each of its network interfaces.
If the target computer does not exist, there wiU be no ARP response and
the translation would not be available. In such an event the queued message
would timeout and ARP would discard outgoing packets. The upper layer
protocols would be informed.

3.3.2

Internet Protocol

The IP module and its route table are central to working in internet. IP uses
this in-memory table to make routing decisions for packets traveling across
the local LAN. The content of the route table is defined by the network
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administrator. Mistakes can block communication.

IP Names and Address

The Internet address space is administered by the NIC (Network Information
Center). All internets that are connected to the single world-wide Internet
must use network numbers assigned by the NIC. Even if it is not intended
for the local network to be connected to the Internet, the network address
space should stiU be obtained from the NIC. This would avoid difficulties
which may arise if eventually a connection to the Internet were required.
i

Each host is assigned an IP address by the network administrator.

An

IP address consists of a four octet number (32 bits). This address space
is divided in to two parts: the most significant portion defines the network
address and the remaining bits define the host address. For a type C network,
which is the most common type, the three most significant octets are used
as the IP network address. The remaining eight bits are used to assign host
addresses. A type C network, as a consequence, can support a maximum of
254 hosts (addresses 0 and 255 are reserved).
To make it easier for people, most computers also have a name. IP uses a
translation table (see Table 3.4) to convert between the name and address
assigned to each host. For small networks, this translation data is often kept
on each computer. For larger networks, this translation data is stored on a
server and accessed across the network when needed.
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IP Host Address

Host Name

192.1.1.1

BOTTLEBRUSH

192.1.1.2

WATTLE

192.1.1.3

FLAMETREE

192.1.1.4

EUCALYPT

SUITE

Table 3.4: IP Host Name Translation Table
i

It is also usual for IP networks to be assigned names. For simplicity we
have chosen to use a flat name space for the network names. This method
has been abandoned by the Internet community for some time.

However

flat names are stiU used by smaller internet networks. For an explanation
of the more complex hierarchical naming system, the reader is referred to
9]. In our example there are three IP networks which are named after three
Australian cities as shown in Table 3.5. Thus from tables 3.4 and 3.5, it
can be deduced that BOTTLEBRUSH is host number 1 and W A T T L E is
host number 2 on the network called WOLLONGONG. Therefore W A T T L E
is address as WOLLONGONG.WATTLE. Alternatively, the address can be
written as W 0 L L 0 N G 0 N G . 2 .
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Address

Name

192.1.1

WOLLONGONG

192.1.2

SYDNEY

192.1.3

MELBOURNE

Table 3.5: IP Network Name Translation Table
Direct R o u t i n g

Direct routing is the simplest manner in which hosts can communicate using
IP and involves two hosts that are on the same network. That is, suppose
WATTLE had an IP packet for FLAMETREE (see Figure 3.3), then the IP
header would contain WATTLE's IP address as the source, and FLAMETREE's IP address as the destination. Likewise, the Ethernet header would
contain WATTLE's Ethernet address as the source and FLAMETREE's
Ethernet address as the destination. This is summarized in Table 3.6, where
for the purpose of illustrative clarity, the Ethernet addresses are represented
as the host's name in lower-case. For this simple case, IP simply becomes an
overhead as little is gained over the service offered by Ethernet. However,
IP does add to the cost by consuming CPU cycles and network bandwidth.

To correctly address the packet, WATTLE uses its route table. The decision
WATTLE must make is, given the FLAMETREE IP address, where should
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Address

Source

Destination

IP header

WOLLONGONG.WATTLE

WOLLONGONG.FLAMETREE

Ethernet header

wattle

flametree

Table 3.6: Addresses contained in an Ethernet frame and IP packet

network

direct/indirect flag

Gateway

interface number
\

WOLLONGONG

direct

< blank >

1

SYDNEY

indirect

EUCALYPT

1

MELBOURNE

indirect

EUCALYPT

1

Table 3.7: WATTLE's Route Table
the IP packet be sent. The route table, illustrated in Table 3.7, contains one
row for each known network. The primary columns in the route table are:
IP Network, direct/indirect flag. Gateway, and Network Interface Number.
This table is referred to by IP for each outgoing IP packet.
The protocol extracts the network portion from FLAMETREE's address,
w a t t l e ' s IP module is able to scan the first column of the table to look for
a match. In this example a match is found on the first row. From the other
information in the first row, one can see that FLAMETREE can be reached
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directly through network interface number 1. An ARP table translation
is done on FLAMETREE's IP address before sending the Ethernet frame
directly to FLAMETREE.

Indirect Routing

Before proceeding with indirect routing let us briefly re-examine the network
as illustrated in Figure 3.3. The internet is composed of three Ethernets. The
hosts, EUCALYPT, IRONBARK, and SILKY-OAK act as the networks IP
gateways. Each network has four hosts and each host has its own IP address
i

and Ethernet address.
When computers WATTLE and EUCALYPT communicate, direct routing
is used because both hosts are on the same IP network. However, when
WATTLE communicates with WARATAH, EUCALYPT must forward the
IP packet to SILKY-OAK for final delivery. This communication is, as the
name suggests, indirect. This routing of IP packets is done by IP modules
and happens transparently for the layers above IP.
Table 3.8 summarizes the addressing WATTLE will use, after consulting
the Routing Table, to send a IP packet to WARATAH. Notice that in this
indirect routing example, the destination IP address is WARATAH's, but
WATTLE must send the packet to EUCALYPT for forwarding. That is, the
destination Ethernet address is EUCALYPT's.
The IP packet will arrive at EUCALYPT's IP module via its WOLLON-
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source

destination

WOLLONGONG.WATTLE

SYDNEY.WARATAH

wattle

eucalypt

address

IP header

PROTOCOL

Ethernet header

Table 3.8: Addresses Used in Indirect Address.

network

direct/indirect flag

router

interface number

WOLLONGONG

direct

< blank >

1

SYDNEY

indirect

OPEN-GATEl

2

MELBOURNE

indirect

OPEN-GATEl

2

Table 3.9: EUCALYPT's Route Table
GONG network interface. Since EUCALYPT is a gateway it must be connected to at least two networks: the Ethernet LAN and the opennet WAN.
The IP module will examine the destination and find it does not match its
own. EUCALYPT's IP module will examine its Routing Table, shown in
Table 3.9, and re-addressing the packet as summarized in Table 3.10.
Notice that EUCALYPT also uses indirect addressing to pass the message to
OPEN-GATEl which is the next gateway between EUCALYPT and SILKYOAK. OPEN-GATEl in turn will do the same, passing the IP packet to the
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address

source

destination

IP header

WATTLE

WARATAH

opennet header

eucalypt

open-gatel

Table 3.10: EUCALYPT's Route Table
next gateway and so on until it arrives at SILKY-OAK. The packet can
then be delivered by direct addressing. A second point worth mentioning is
that the underlying network technology may change may times during the
packets journey, however the service provided by the IP modules remains
essentially the same.

3.3.3

I n t e r n e t Control M e s s a g e P r o t o c o l

Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is a part of the Network layer and
is used to modify some aspect of the sender's behavior. An ICMP message
could be sent by either an intermediate gateway or the destination host to
inform the sender of a perceived problem. The following list illustrates the
type of massaging that is carried out. This is by no means a complete list.

1. Echo Response and Reply. This message pair is used by a host to test
if the destination machine is reachable.
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2. Destination Unreachable. When a gateway is unable to deliver a datagram, this message is sent to inform the sender.
3. Source Quench. The message is sent by a host to request that the rate
at which datagrams are sent be slowed.
4. Re-direct. If the configuration of internet has changed then the routing table in an individual host may need to be updated. The re-direct
message essentially provides this mechanism. When the primary gateway detects that the sender of a message is not using the optimum
route, it sends this message to update the host's routing table.

»

5. Datagram Time Exceeded. This message is sent back to the sender
by the gateway which has discarded a message because its time to live
counter reached zero.
6. Datagram Parameter Problem. This message reports to the sender
problems in the datagram header.
7. Address Mask Request and Reply. Subnetworks allow multiple physical networks to share a single IP network address space. This message
pair allows a host to request its subnetwork mask information.

3.3.4

Reverse Address Resolution Protocol

Reverse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP) provide a service that is the
reverse of ARP (see Section 3.3.1). That is, suppose that a host knows its
own Ethernet address but wishes to learn its IP address. This situation
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could arise while a host is starting up. RARP allows that host to broadcast
a message in order to obtain its IP address information from another host
on the same network.

3.4

Transport Layer

TCP and UDP are the two most used protocols which reside above the
IP. Their purpose is to provide applications with an end to end connection
mechanism which hides the details of the network connections. Layers below
the Transport layer are concerned with transmission and routing of packets
across interconnected networks. In other words a "host to host" connection.
By contrast, the Transport layer protocols provide a reliable and efficient
delivery service between applications.
Both TCP and UDP are designed to allow multiple applications on a particular host to communicate concurrently. Both distinguish between applications
within a host by a mechanism called ports. These ports have a sixteen bit
integer identification and are local to a given host. Though both protocols
use ports, they are independent of each other and the port numbers are
separately assigned. That is, the name of the transportation protocol used,
is included in the IP header and so, the packet is passed up to the Transport layer protocol before the port number is evaluated.

Secondly, since

the IP addresses are evaluated below the Transport layer, a combination of
the mechanisms is able to uniquely identify any communicating application
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within an internet.

3.4.1

User D a t a g r a m Protocol

UDP offers to applications a connection-less datagram service which does
not guarantee delivery. It provides a mechanism by which multiple applications on a single host can concurrently send and receive messages. The UDP
datagrams contain both the source and the destination port addresses, giving the message recipient the ability to reply. UDP provides a low overhead
transportation service which adds little to the service provided by the IP
module. Importantly, it does not use acknowledgment to ensure messages
are delivered nor does it reorder message parts which may have arrived out
of order. UDP adds two services to that provided by IP. One is the multiplexing of information between applications based on port number. Second,
a checksum can be included in each datagram to check for communication
error and data integrity.

3.4.2

Transmission Control Protocol

TCP currently is implemented on a variety of networks. It is designed to
provide applications with an orderly, reliable transmission service. Since it
makes few assumptions about the underlying network, it is able to provide a
reliable end-to-end service over an unreliable network. The rational behind
TCP is tliat often, applications require an exchange of data and to use a
transmission system that does not guarantee reliable delivery would require
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each application to have error detection and recovery built in. The goal of
TCP is to provide a general purpose solution to a problem that is common
to a number of applications.
TCP is able to provide a reliable service by using a technique called positive
acknowledgment with retransmits. This requires the recipient to acknowledge
each message it receives. The sender keeps a record of messages that have
been sent but not acknowledged. The sender also maintains a timer for each
message so that a retransmission can be made if a message were to be lost.
Messages are assigned a sequence number so that duplicate messages can
be detected and discarded.

Message sequencing is also used to correctly

reconstruct message parts that arrive out of sequence.

3.5

Applications

Application layer protocols that have been specified for the internet protocols
suite are numerous. In this section three well-known application protocols
are described.

3.5.1

TELNET

TELNET is a standard application level protocol that is part of the internet
protocol suite and provides a virtual terminal capability. TELNET allows
users at one site to establish a TCP connection with a server at remote site.
By passing key strokes from the local host and displaying the echoes from the
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remote host, the user is provided with the ability to access remote services
online. The TELNET protocol includes a mechanism which allows the two
ends to negotiate various options including data type, screen configuration
and keyboard configuration.
TELNET has gained wide acceptance and is widespread. It has been implemented in a large number of operating system environments and provides
good interoperability.

3.5.2

File Transfer Protocol

File Transfer Protocol (FTP), like TELNET, has been implemented under
a large number of operating systems. It is designed to allow users to copy
files between local and remote hosts." Even though the user initiates the
process from the local machijie, files can be transferred in either direction.
File transfer is only possible after the user has been identified by the remote
machine which is accomplished by a login process. This process is used by
the remote operating system to establish the rights the user has over files.
Communication between the two hosts uses TCP and is essentially over an
insecure network.

3.5.3

Remote Commands

'

The remote command family has been designed to allow a user to execute
Unix style commands on remote hosts. A number of these remote equivalents
commands have been created and are available principally on Unix systems.
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The naming convention used for this family requires the remote command
name to have the letter "r" placed in in front of the Unix command. That is,
the Unix copy command "cp" has a remote equivalent "rep" and the Unix
command "who" has "rwho".
Remote commands provide a convenient way for user to execute commands
on a remote host. However, little consideration has been given to security.
System security is based on a system of trusted hosts. The system administer chooses a set of hosts that can be trusted. Once a user's identity has
been established on one host within this defined set, that identity will be
t

trusted by all hosts in that set. The user's identity is included in the remote
command message.
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Chapter 4

A Look at internet Protocol
Suite Security

Although the internet protocol suite was developed with the aid of sponsorship from the United States Department of Defense (commonly referred
to as DoD), the protocols are in wide use in all manner of environments
including industrial, commercial and of course the Internet itself. We have
noted that during its conception and implementation, security was not the
primary concern. Greater emphasis was placed on issues such as efficiency
and inter-operability.
Very little in the way of security services currently exist within the most
widely used implementations of the protocol suite. The underlying assumption has been that these protocols were modules in a computer operating
system and access would be gained by the normal file mechanisms. This
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method of providing secure communication cannot ensure security for two
reasons. First, in a large internet, it is unreasonable to expect every host to
be verifyably secure. Second, for a conversation between two principals to
take place, IP packets must navigate a number of networks. It is unlikely
that the two communicating principals trust (or even know) the gateways
involved.
In this chapter we discuss the need for adding security to the internet protocol suite by examining some of the "holes" that have been found.

The

approach taken is to show some of the problems that currently exist and'
t
thus illustrate the types of issues any security service must address.

The

thrust of this chapter has been kept very informal and has the aim of giving
the reader a flavor of the issues involved in providing security services.

4.1

The Adversary

Before examining some of the current problems, let us quickly profile the
adversary. It is commonly accepted that the adversary has the power to
examine, modify and inject packets into internet. This is a reasonable assumption since an internet is made up a number of networks which are
controUed by autonomous organizations. We can break up the attacks that
an adversary can launch into six broad categories.

• By eavesdropping, or monitoring network traffic, an adversary hopes
to gain some advantage or learn some secret. To avoid this threat all
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hosts that come in contact with the packet, including gateways, must
by trusted. If an adversary has access to a host that the IP packet
must navigate, then monitoring is possible. This could of course occur
if a host were compromised, however SLS we wiU see, an adversary can
use other means.

• A modification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets
as they travel across the computer network. For such an attack to
succeed the changes must be undetected.
• The goal of a replay attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowledge by retransmitting a message that was intercepted earlier.

An

important point to note is that a replay attack can be used against
protocols which use encryption. The attack may be successful even
though the adversary is unable to break the underlying cryptographic
system and has no knowledge of the secret key used. The example
often quoted to illustrate this is the vulnerability in the Diffie-HeUman
key exchange [36].

• In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of
the principals in the system.
• A delay attack is an attempt by an adversary to gain advantage by
delaying communications betw^een principals.

Detection of such an

attack is important when communications are time critical.
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• A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary that is
able to hinder communications is some manner. Detection of such an
attack is difficult in an internet environment.

4.2

Address Based Authentication

Much of the vulnerability of the internet protocol suite is due to a reliance
on address based authentication. It is common practice to trust the integrity
of the IP packet header; in particular the source address field is often taken
i
to be proof of identity. Since our profile of the adversary enables him (or
her) to fabricate false messages, this is a flawed practice.
To illustrate the point consider the manner in which F T P [29] works. A
F T P client requests TCP to open a connection with the host it specifies.
The details of the connection is left to TCP. FTP has no mean of verifying
that the remote server is the one actually requested. When a user login
prompt is received by the FTP client, the user wiU, with very few exceptions,
enter the account name and password. The assumption made is that T C P
has connected to the correct server. There are two points worth noting
regarding the F T P protocol. One, the server is not chaUenged regarding its
identity. Two, the server has no means of detecting or countering a replay
attack.
T C P identifies the remote server by associating it with a T C P port within
the local host. That is, the local TCP module assumes that aH data sent
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through that port are received by the server and all data received from the
port were sent by the server. In reality TCP trusts the data received from
the port because it trusts the underlying IP layer. The IP layer in turn relies
on the address contained in the IP packet header to determine source and
route. Thus, FTP security relies heavily on the addresses contained in the
IP packet header, in other words, address based authentication.

4.3

Source Route Attack

Included in the IP header is a field called the Optional Field which allows
certain types of processing to be carried out on the IP packets. Since this
optional processing is part of the IP specification, all implementation must
include it. Source Route is one of the options specified.
Source Route allows the sender of an IP packet to dictate the route to be
taken. The primary use of this option is made by administrators to test a
particular network or overcome a temporary difficulty. In [5], an attack is
described that takes advantage of this mechanism. The attack relies on a
common practice where the recipient of an IP packet will use the reverse
of the source route information to transmit the reply.

This is of course

quite reasonable since the sender may wish a particular path be followed to
overcome technical difficulties such as a failed gateway. For this attack to
succeed, the adversary requires that a TCP channel be opened via a specified
routine. To illustrate, consider the network configuration in Figure 4.1. A
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quick reference to Figure 3.3 may also be of benefit.

WATTLE

SILKY-OAK

EUCALYPT

WARATAH

3»
(TARGET)

G4

G5

G6

, (ADVERSARY)

Figure 4.1: Source Route Attack

In this example WATTLE is the target of the attack and WARATAH is a
remote host that is trusted by WATTLE. The gateway G4 is part of the open
network and is under the control of the adversary. The gateways normally
used by WATTLE and WARATAH to communicate are EUCALYPT, G l ,
G2, G3 and SILKY-OAK. None of these have been compromised.
The aim of this attack is for the adversary to be able to masquerade as
WARATAH. To accomplish this the adversary is going to attempt to trick
WATTLE into routing the conversation through gateway G4. If successful
all messages destined for WARATAH wiU be received by the adversary who
can then fabricate replies as if they originated from WARATAH. Of course
WARATAH as no knowledge of this exchange. The details of the attack are
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as follows.

1. The adversary fabricates a TCP open message such that the source
in the IP packet header is WARATAH. The packet also uses the IP
Source Route option where the route specified passes through gateway
G4.
2. WATTLE responds by engaging in the TCP open protocol. It sends
its own sequence number and acknowledges the previous message. It
is common practice for the reply to be sent via the reverse of the route
specified in the first message. If this is done, the message wiU be sent
via G4 and thus the adversary will be able to intercept it. The attack
will fail if this common practice where not to be followed.

3. Assume the common practice is followed. The adversary will be able
to complete the process and open the TCP channel. The adversary
will have gained access to aU facilities available to WARATAH. In the
case where WARATAH is a trusted host, the attack could have serious
consequences.

4.4

R o u t i n e Information P r o t o c o l Attack

Routine Information Protocol (RIP) is very widely used.

Its popularity

stems from its distribution with the Berkeley Unix system. The purpose of
RIP is to provide dynamic routing services for internet gateways by which
routine tables are automatically updated.

This is achieved by gateways
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within an internet system exchanging information regarding routing and
reachability. An interesting fact about RIP is that despite its popularity,
RIP has been written and is in wide usage without a formal standard [9 .
There are two types of RIP messages, route messages and messages used
for debugging.(control tracing). We will only be concerned with the route
messages in the following discussion. RIP route messages are periodically
broadcast by gateways to advertise changes in the routing dynamics. These
unsolicited messages are, typically, trusted by the receiving gateway and
the information contained is accepted without the sources being verified [5].
Essentially another example of address based authentication.
In sending the message, a gateway informs its peers of the distance between it
and a specified destination. The distance is measured in "hops" (the number
of gateways between the two). By creating a false RIP message, an adversary
can attack the system [5]. Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 4.2
which shows the distance to WARATAH measured from WATTLE.
Once again the normal route between WATTLE and WARATAH uses gateways Gl, G2 and 0 3 and the adversary has control of gateway G4. In
order to intercept messages sent by WATTLE, the adversary fabricates a
RIP message to Gl which states that gateway G4 is one (1) hop away from
WARATAH. The RIP message to gateway G5 maintains the correct state;
that is G4 is four (4) hops away. If successful, traffic from WATTLE will be
routed through gateway G4 by gateway Gl. The new route will use gateways Gl, G4, G5, G6 and G3 resulting in the adversary gaining control of
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OPEN NETWORK

WATTLE

EUCALYPT

SILKY-OAK

Gl
4 HOPS

G2
3 HOPS

G4
4 HOPS

WARATAH

G3
2 HOPS

IHOP

G5
3 HOP

OHOPS

G6
2 HOPS

Figure 4.2: Routine Information Protocol Attacks
the communication channel by manipulating the RIP protocol. The adversary would not only be able to monitor traffic but also launch a masquerade
attack similar to that described in Section 4.3.

4.5

I C M P Vulnerabilities

The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is fundamental to the way IP
functions. Its role is to provide a mechanism by which a sender of a message
can be informed of problems that are detected by the recipient or one of
the intervening gateways. Commonly these messages are sent as a result of
some change in the internet network such as a change in the configuration
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or a failure. The ICMP messages are designed to inform the sender so that
it can modify its behavior in order to avoid the detected problem. In this
section we will examine two of these message types which offer a potential
for abuse.

4.5.1

Redirect Message

Under normal conditions an individual host's route table changes infrequently. Changes are only required if there are changes to the local network
or failure of a local gateway. As gateways exchange route information regularly, their routine information is Ukely to be correct. The ICIP Redirect
message is used by gateways to advise the sender of a better route and contains the IP header and the first sixty four bit of the original message. This
is to enable the sender to identify the particular message concerned. On
receiving the Redirect message, the host (that is the sender of the original
message) makes a change to its route table, which enables the next message
to take advantage of the more optimum route.
An adversary may be able to take advantage of this mechanism by havirig
the message directed through an insecure host. The attack is made slightly
more difficult by the fact that a Redirect message must tied to a particular
connection and only the primary gateway (the first gateway) can send the
Redirect message.
The method used in the following attack is quite simple and was suggest in
5]. Consider, an adversary has control of BOTTLEBRUSH (see Figure 3.3)
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and wishes to intercept messages sent by WATTLE to WARATAH. The
steps that would be taken by the adversary in this attempt are as follows:

1. The adversary waits until WARATAH is unreachable for some reason,
say scheduled maintenance. The adversary then sends a T C P open
request to WATTLE, claiming to be WARATAH. This is a matter of
constructing the message with a false IP header such that the source
address is WARATAH's.

2. W A T T L E responds by a engaging in the T C P open sequence. This
1

message will of course be routed through EUCALYPT which has not
been compromised.
3. While the message is en route, the adversary sends a Redirect message
claiming to be EUCALYPT. Since the ICIP Redirect message is tied
to a connection it appears to be genuine and WATTLE is likely to
modify its route table without further validation. Apart for the synchronization message that has been lost by the adversary, all further
messages would be routed through BOTTLEBRUSH.

To succeed, the adversary relies on WATTLE not performing an adequate
amount of validation on the ICMP Redirect messages it receives. If successful
the adversary will control the channel and thus have the ability to masquerade as WARATAH. Depending on the IP implementation, the change to
the route tables may last for some time in which case the adversary can
monitor and even modify messages sent by WATTLE to WARATAH. The
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attack once again did not require the adversary to break-in to any machine.
The attack would also mean that the adversary may have access to information that is protected by authentication mechanisms at the application
layer. This information may not have been available by simply breaking-in
to a single user's account.

4.5.2

Destination Unreachable Message

ICMP may also be used for targeted denial of service attack. Several of
its messages such as Destination Unreachable and Time Exceeded may be
i

used to reset existing connections. If the adversary knows the local and
remote port number of a TCP connection, an ICMP packet aimed at that
connection can be forged. Such information is sometimes available through
netstat service.

4.6

T C P Sequence Number Prediction Attack

Before discussing the security weakness described by Morris in [23] let us
briefly recap the way in which TCP connections are established. Every TCP
message has a sequence number. This is so that duplicate messages can
be detected and discarded. Message sequencing is also used to correctly
reconstruct message parts that may arrive out of sequence.
For WATTLE and WARATAH to estabUsh a connection, the TCP modules on both machines must engage in a protocol known as a three-way
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handshake [9]. A primary function of this exchange is for the two machines
to synchronize sequence numbers. The method used is quite simple, each
machine informs the other of the sequence number to be used. On every
subsequent message the sequence number is increased. The steps involved
in this handshake a.re as follows. WATTLE is the initiator.

1. WATTLE requests a connection with WARATAH by sending the first
message in this three step exchange. WATTLE sets the synchronization bit in the message in order to indicate to WARATAH that this
is an attempt to open a communications channel. The message eontains a sequence number which WATTLE wishes WARATAH to use
in messages it sends as part of this conversation message (see 3.4.2).
2. WARATAH responds by sending its own sequence number and acknowledging the message from WATTLE.
3. WATTLE completes the sequence by acknowledging WARATAH's message.

In Berkeley Unix, every host increases the sequence number it will use for the
next connection, each second by a constant amount and half that amount
each time a connection is initiated. This is to ensure that sequence numbers
are not repeated for existing connections.
Suppose that WARATAH is a trusted machine and that the adversary has
control of BOTTLEBRUSH which is not trusted. Further suppose WATTLE
and WARATAH communicate at regular intervals. Morris pointed out that

52CHAPTER 4. A LOOK AT INTERNET

PROTOCOL SUITE

SECURITY

if the adversary is able to predict the sequence number used by WARATAH
during a conversation, then it is possible to inject a message.

It is not

necessary for the adversary to receive the traffic between WARATAH and
WATTLE. Such a attack could be devastating if the adversary was allowed
to execute malicious commands; for instance using the Berkeley's remote
shell.
To predict the sequence number the adversary initiates a connection with
the sole purpose of discovering the current sequence number. In this case
BOTTLEBRUSH initiates a connection with WARATAH. Having obtained
i

the sequence number and having knowledge of how the sequence numbers
are incremented, the adversary can predict, with a high degree of confidence,
the sequence number that will be used on the next connection.

Chapter 5

Communication Security
In the previous chapter we took an informal look at some security issues
that are faced by administrators of a great many systems within the Internet
community. In this chapter we will discuss issues related to mechanisms and
services that can be used to implement security.
In an attempt to provide security within the internet protocol suite, we must
consider two fundamental questions:

• W h a t are the communication security services that would be required
to allow users to communicate securely?

• W h a t mechanisms are available to provide these?
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Before the advent of the workstation, computing services were provided by
large centralized time share machines. In such an environment, the operating
system was responsible for protecting users from each other and controlling
access to shared resources.

Each user was required to prove his (or her)

identity to the computer system by a login process. This identity formed
the basis by which the rights and privileges of a given user were determined.
Data security and integrity remained the sole responsibility of the individual
operating system.

.

More recently, there has been a move away from the centralized approach
to one where resources are distributed over a number of computer systems.
Users within a distributed system may require services from various computers, these may be geographically separated. The issue of data security
and integrity is often made more difficult by having computers within the
distributed system such that, the network administrator cannot guarantee
that proper access control mechanisms are in place. The two most common
reasons for such a occurrence are: first, the distributed system includes computers whose access control mechanisms can be circumvented. The inclusion
of personal computers within a distributed system is commonly quoted as
an example of this type of problem. Second, access has been given to computers that are outside the organization's direct control. This of course is a
common.problem within the Internet community.
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The need for adequate security services for networks that use the internet
protocol suite remains largely unsatisfied. The networks themselves are vulnerable to various types of attacks.

There is no systematic provision for

protecting the confidentiality of user communications and in many cases it
is comparatively easy for intruders to intercept, understand, alter communications, or even originate forgeries. Since there is no standard effective
method for the authentication of network principals, the Internet provides
an excellent vehicle for allowing the criminal to remain anonymous while
committing theft or acts of vandalism.

5.2

Security Services

For principals to communicate securely within a distributed system, three
basic services are required [13]. These are:

• Authentication. Informally, authentication is the capability of the recipient of a communication to be able to verify that the message did
come from the alleged sender. It is often the case that the recipient
of a message will trust the sender's identity contained in the message.
However, without proper authentication, it would not be possible to
prove this identity to a third party.

• Privacy. Refers to the protection of information against interception
of individual IP packets. It is worth making the distinction between
privacy and transmission security. That is, even if an adversary is pre-

56

CHAPTER

5. COMMUNICATION

SECURITY

vented from discovering the content of any individual message, valuable
deductions can be made by examining the time, length and distribution
of various messages. Measures to prevent an opponent from studying
the overall flow of communication are called transmission security [12
Integrity. Refers to protection data against manipulation.

In [13] Nechvatel suggested a fourth service called

nonrepudiation,

that

could be included in the list of basic services. Nonrepudiation would protect
the sender against denial of the message being received. A system of receipts
could be implemented to provide this service. However, it is worth noting
that a receipt itself is a message which, if it is to be believed, must rely on the
three basic services listed above. Also, receipts add to the cost of conducting
a conversation and it may not be necessary for a receipt to be produced for
every message. Thus the choice of whether receipts are necessary should be
left to an exchange protocol.

5.3

Delivery of Security Services

Link Security is one of two approaches by which security services can be
delivered [13]. In a network protected by Hnk security, encryption is placed
low in the protocol suite stack, either as part of the Physical layer (ISO level
1) or the Data Link layer (ISO level 2). This approach requires that aU traffic
be enciphered before transmission over the network and deciphered by the
receiving host. Link encryption provides good protection against external
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threats sucli as traffic analysis, since the entire packet, including the IP and
TCP headers, is encrypted. Encryption is usually implemented with the
aid of hardware and thus link security can be readily incorporated into an
existing network.
However, link encryption has a major disadvantage: since the entire message
is enciphered, every en route gateway must decipher each packet in order to
be able to route. A message may have to be encrypted and decrypted several
times before it is finally delivered. In addition to increasing the burden on
the network, if a gateway is compromised then all traffic flowing through
I

that gateway is also compromised. Further, link encryption requires the use
of a common algorithm and that all gateways within the network be trusted
with a key which can decipher all messages. Such an agreement is highly
unlikely in a open network environment such as the Internet, where control
is not exercised by a single organization.
The second method of providing security is called end-to-end security which
requires that the security services be provided above the Transport layer [13 .
In this method a message is encrypted and decrypted only at the end points,
thereby largely circumventing the problems due to compromised intervening
gateways. End-to-end security has two advantages which make it attractive
for a implementation within a network like the Internet. First, encryption
above TCP level can secure any conversation between source and destination
systems, regardless of the number of hops or quality of link [5]. Second,
implementation would not require changing the manner in which TCP or IP
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function. The change could be limited to hosts that are participating in the
conversation. In other words, the Internet would not be expected to provide
any security, but simply be a conduit for secure communications.
For end-to-end security to work, addressing information (IP and TCP headers) must be left in plaintext (not encrypted). This is to allow gateways to
route packets which would make the system vulnerable to traffic analysis.
However, for most environments this is probably an acceptable compromise
between security and practical considerations.

i

5.4

Security Mechanisms

The security service that are essential for secure communication rely on
certain cryptographic primitives for their implementation. In [13] primitive
services are grouped thus:

• Encryption which can be used to ensure privacy.
• Digital Signatures which are useful in authentication schemes.
• Manipulation Detection Codes used to guard against data manipulation.

Many such cryptographic systems have been designed and are available. For
the purpose of our discussions the system's cryptographic requirements can
be simplified and kept generic. In the following discussion the choice to use a
public key cryptographic system has been made because of the improvements
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in the security of key management and its ability to provide digital signatures
12, 36, 13].

5.4.1

Encryption

D a t a confidentially service provides a way to prevent information from being
disclosed by transforming plaintext into cipher-text. In using cryptographic
systems to provide privacy, either public key (eg. [45, 33]) or conventional
cryptographic-system (eg. [8, 1]) can by used. A public key system differs from a secret key (or symmetric) system in that each principal in the
t

distributed system has a pair of keys. The calculation of this private and
public key pair, given the initial conditions, is easy. However, it would be
infeasible for an adversary who knows a public key to calculate the secret
key or the initial conditions. Each principal has a private key which is kept
secret and is only known to that principal. The corresponding public key
is made available to all other principals. In the remainder of this document
means encipher with key Z. The private and pubhc key pair wiU be
denoted as " X " and "Y" respectively and subscripts will be used to identify
the associated principal.
XaiYa

Thus, the principal, Alice, would have the pair

while Bob would have

Xb^Yb-

The advantage of a public key system is that it supports secrecy, authentication, and integrity. Communication secrecy is supported by the transformations [36]:
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M = {{M}y^}X^

(5.1)

That is, suppose Alice wishes send a secret message, M, to Bob. Then Alice
must have access Bob's public key and encipher the message, thus:

C = {M}y^

(5.2)

Alice sends Bob the cryptographic string C. On receipt Bob is able to employ
his private key to decipher the message.

{C}Xs = {{M}Y^}Xn=M

(5.3)

The encryption and decryption processes are easy using the appropriate keys.
However, it would be infeasible for an adversary to decipher C without the
private key Xb, ensuring secrecy. Now, since Yb is publicly known, Bob has
no way of being certain of the sender's identity. Thus authenticity has not
been assured using this method.

5.4.2

Authentication

Authentication, using a pubhc key system, is satisfied by the following transformation [361.

M =

(5.4)
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Alice is able to "sign" her message to Bob by using her private key, Xa'

C = {M}x,

(5.5)

Bob is able to verify that the message could have only come from Alice by
deciphering the message using Alice's public key,

{C}y^ =

5.4.3

thus:

= M

(5.6)

Manipulation D e t e c t i o n Code

If the message, M, is plaintext, Bob knows that C has in fact not been
altered.

However, if the message, or any portion of the message, has a

random string then it may be difficult for Bob to ascertain that the message
has not been altered merely by examining it [13]. For this reason it is more
usual for Alice to employ a suitable one-way hashing function (eg. [32, 44])
to produce a Manipulation Detection Code (MDC) [36]. Alice would sign
the MDC with her private key and append it to the message. On receiving
the message. Bob is able to reproduce the MDC in order to confirm that the
message is from Alice and that it has not been altered. Finally, all three can
be employed by Alice to communicate securely with Bob thus:

C = {M,{MDC}X^}ys

(5-7)
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Chapter 6

Authentication and Key
Distribution Systems

Currently, the dominant authentication and key distribution protocols employed in a client-server environments use a broker to arbitrate between
principals who wish to communicate. In such a scheme the broker is usually
referred to as the authentication server (AS). A principal must first contact
the AS to obtain credentials which can be trusted by its communicating
partner. The protocol will typically rely on an exchange of cryptographic
messages and the participants knowledge of some secret. Well-known examples of such systems are Kerberos [40, 19, 4, 20], SPX [42], KryptoKnight
22] and more recently Kuperee [15].
In this chapter we will describe two very well-known implementations. The
first of these called Kerberos, was designed for and is currently used in,
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a number of internet environments. KryptoKniglit, the second illustrative
example, is a more recent development and will probably be seen in the
future at a number of sites within the Internet.

6.1

Principals and Realms

The use of the terms principal and realm has become conventional within
the area of secure communications and their meaning has remained fairly
consistent for quite sometime. It is however worth stating the use of these
terms in the context of this document and so avoid difficulties caused by
them being new to some readers or used differently elsewhere.
All communicating network entities are referred to as principals. This group
is further subdivided into three:

• The user is the human being who is using some services that are provided by the network. All programs in the system are initiated by
users. The main purpose of authentication is to verify the identity of
the users within a network.

• A client is a program that runs on behalf of a user in order to request
some service on a remote host. Since the client runs on a user's behalf,
it assumes the user identity and privileges.

Any action taken by a

client is said to have been carried out by the user. Notice that there
is-an investment of trust being made by the user. That is, the user
IS assuming that the client software has been correctly implemented
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and that it will perform its stated function properly. A Trojan Horse
would prove disastrous.
• The server is a program that provides a service to a client on the
network. It is usually installed by the system administrator and runs
on behalf of the system. A server remains active in a network for
much longer than a client and thus is given its own identity. By this,
it is meant, that similarly to users, each server is registered with the
authentication server and must prove its identity before a client will
accept it.
t

A realm in terms of a third-party authentication system is organized in a
hierarchical structure and has a strong analogy to a domain in the Internet.
A single Authentication Server (AS) is responsible for all local principals
that are registered with it. This collection of network entities, the AS and its
clients, are referred to as a realm. A client who wishes to obtain some service
for a server within the same realm would first need to obtain a credential
from the AS. These credentials, which are in the form of tickets, are discussed
in some detail later in this chapter. For the moment it is enough to say that,
a client is able to prove its identity to a server by presenting a ticket. The
ticket having been issued to the client by the AS for that server.
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Kerberos

Kerberos [19, 40] is one of the best known efforts to provide an authentication
service and was developed at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
as part of Project Athena [4]. It is based on the well-known Needham and
Schroeder scheme [24] and incorporates modifications that were proposed by
Denning and Sacco [11 .
Kerberos shares a private encryption key with each of its clients. These
shared keys are used to construct credentials that will convince one principal
that the identity of another is genuine. To establish this level of trust between
principals, Kerberos must have the trust of all principals within its realm.
The description of Kerberos that foUows has been greatly simplified. Additional fields are present in the tickets, authenticators, and messages. Some
additional functionality, including renewable and forwardable tickets, are
supported in Kerberos Version 5. For a more rigorous presentation of these,
the reader is referred to [20]. Additional information on software releases,
both free and supported, can be found in [17].

6.2.1

Pre-authentication

Kerberos offers two services to its clients, pre-authentication which is performed by Key Distribution Centre (KDC) and Ticket Generation which is.
performed by the Ticket-Granting Server (TGS). A request to the KDC is
usually initiated by a client who wishes to obtain authentication credentials
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but currently holds none. Typically, this exchange occurs when the user
initially logs in to the network. The secret key which is shared by the user
and the KDC is used for encryption and decryption of all messages between
the two principals. At the end of the exchange, assuming it is successful,
the client obtains credentials that will be acceptable to the TGS and a randomly generated session key. Subsequently all exchanges between the client
and the TGS wiU use this session key and not the user's secret key. The
prime purpose of this pre-authentication exchange is to minimize the chance
that client's secret key will be compromised. This pre-authentication process
is illustrated in Figure 6.1.

AUTHENTICATION SERVER

SERVER

CLIENT

Figure 6.1: Kerberos Pre-Authentication

1. Client

KDC: c,TGS

The client sends a message to the KDC requesting credentials for the
named server. Normally the request names the TGS, as is the case in

6SCHAPTER 6. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY DISTRIBUTION

SYSTEMS

this example. However, some services such as "change user password"
require credentials from the KDC.
The requesting message sent by the client, which is in plaintext, contains its own identity (c) and the identity of the server (TGS). The
credentials obtained will only be enciphered so that they are only useful to the named principals.
2. KDC ^ Client: {T,,tgs.Kc,tgs}k.
The KDC responds with the requested credentials encrypted in the
client's secret key. The credentials consist of:
• A ticket, Tc,tgs, for the server. The ticket format is explained in
Section 6.2.3.
• A temporary encryption key, often called a session key, Kc,TGS-

This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance that the request was
from the client named, c. The KDC simply relies on the secret key that is
known only by itself and the named client who is acting on the users behalf.
No one else should be able to decipher the reply.

6.2.2

Obtaining Service Credentials

At the end of the pre-authentication exchange the client wiU have obtained
credentials which are acceptable only to the TGS and have a finite Hfetime.
The client is required to re-apply at the end of this period. In the event that
the client wishes to obtain service from some server on the network, it is
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necessary for it to obtain additional credentials. Credentials for individual
servers are issued by the TGS as illustrated in Figure 6.2.

AUTHENTICATION SERVER

CUE

SERVER

Figure 6.2: Kerberos Obtaining Service Credentials

1. C l i e n t

T G S : S,TC,TGS, AC^TGS

The client transmits to the TGS a request for credentials for server s.
The message contains two other components in addition to the servers
name, 5:

The ticket, TC,TGS is enciphered with the secret key which the
T G S shares with the KDC. The ticket contains the client's identity, c, and a copy of the session key Kc,TGSThe session key, KC,TGS-> which will be shared by the client and
T G S is used to authenticate the client. The authenticator, AC,TGS^
is constructed by the client and enciphered with the session key.
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Since knowledge of the session key is limited to the three participants, the TGS can be sure of the client's identity.
2. TGS ^ Ghent:
The TGS deciphers and validates the credentials presented by the
chent.

If they are acceptable, the TGS will generate a session key

to be used by the chent and the server together with credentials that
will be acceptable to the server. The main difference between these
credentials and those obtained by the chent in the pre-authentication
phase is that tickets issued by the TGS have a shorter hfe.
3. Client =i> Server:
Having obtained credentials from the TGS, the chent is able to present
these to the server as a means of initiating a conversation. Once again
the format of the message components is similar to that in step one.
4. Server =i> Ghent: {timestamp

^

Optionally, the chent may require proof of the server's identity. In such
a case the server must extract the timestamp from the ticket, modify
it, and return it to the chent enciphered with the session key. Note
that the timestamp is modified by increasing its value by one. Since
the session key is only known to the participants, the server is able to
prove its identity.
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6.2.3

Credentials

Within the Kerberos authentication system credentials are used to prove
the identity of one principal to an other. There are two types of credentials
which fulfill different requirements. A ticket is issued to a client and is used
to securely pass information from the issuing authority to the server. Notice
the ticket is not issued to the server directly, but is presented by the client
as part of its credentials. The ticket has the following format:

{5, c, addr, timestamp,

life,

Kc,s}ks

where:

the name of the server.
the name of the client to whom the ticket was issued,
addr

the client's IP address.
the time at which the ticket was issued. This field

timestamp
ensures that the ticket is current.
the ticket's life. That is the period after which the
life
ticket will not be valid.
C,5
K.

the session key.
the server's secret key. This key is known only to the server and
the issuing authority and is used to encipher the ticket.

T h e second type of credential is the authenticator.

This is used to prove
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that the client presenting the ticket is the legitimate owner. Unlike the
ticket, the authenticator is freslily constructed by the client. The form of
the authenticator is as follows:

{c, addr, time}K^,

where:

c

the

addr

the

time

the
the

The authenticator is transmitted to the server together with the ticket. The
server is able to believe the client's identity because of its knowledge of the
session key.

6.2.4 Limitations
Kerberos is probably the most used of the authentication systems. It has
been incorporated into a number of architectures and commercial offerings.
In spite of its popularity Kerberos suffers from a number of limitations. In
this section we will discuss three of the weaknesses pointed out in [6]. For a
full account the reader is referred to the original paper.
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Replay Attack

Within Kerberos time stamps are used to insure that the credentials presented by a principal are fresh (see 6.2.3). To initiate a conversation a client
presents two types of credentials, a ticket which has been issued by a trust
authority and a freshly generated authenticator. Typically the authenticator
has a life of five minutes.

Consider the following scenario. An adversary in monitoring the local network wait for a "mail check session".

That is a principal login into the

system in order to deal with a few items of electronic mail, before logging
out. Within that short time the user has unwittingly exposed a number of
valuable credentials that may have recorded and could be replayed. Even
if the session key has not been compromised, the protocol is exposed to
a replay attack. Further, the adversary may be able to generate valuable
encrypted data for "cracking" off-line.

Time Synchronization

Kerberos relies quite heavily on hosts within a realm having synchronized
clocks. If a host is misled about the correct time, replay of stolen credentials
becomes a real danger.

There is an in-built assumption within Kerberos

that an authenticated synchronization protocol is being used. It has to be
stressed that a number of commonly used synchronization protocols do not
include adequate security. As Kerberos is being consider for use in more
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varied environments, this is likely to be more problematic.

Session Key Exposure

The term "session key" is some what misused within the Kerberos system.
The key is contained within a ticket and may be used by the client, multiple
times, to obtain service from the same server. The reasoning behind this is;
system load can be lessened by reducing the number of messages required
for two principals to start a conversation and the involvement of the authentication servers. That is, since tickets can only be manufactured by an
authentication server, if the ticket were to be used only once, the authentication would have to be involved in initiating every conversation. The multiple
use of session keys does increase the system's exposure to cryptanalysis

6.3

KryptoKnight

KryptoKnight was jointly developed by IBM Zürich and Yorktown Research
Laboratories. Like Kerberos, KryptoKnight provides a third party authentication service using secret key encryption. The authentication server (AS)
keeps a database on all principals under its dominion. The stated goal of
KryptoKnight [22] is to provide authentication and key distribution services
to users and program. Toward this goal KryptoKnight offers four services:

1. Single Sign-On (SSO);
2. Two-party Authentication;
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3. Key Distribution;

4. Authentication of origin and content of data.

6.3.1

KryptoKnight Encryption Method

KryptoKnight has been impleniented at IBM Zürich Research Laboratory
and a one of its design goals was the exportability of the protocol. Thus
the KryptoKnight protocol does not make use of date encryption in the
manner used by Kerberos. Instead it makes heavy use of keyed one-way
hash functions based on DES [1] or LOKI [8]. The output is a 64 bit hash
of the message. The message text can be of any length.

KM

AC KM =

KMAC{MESSAGE}K M

Notice that the KMAC uses a block cipher and the output is dependent
on both the message and the key KM- Thus, this method can be used to
authenticate the recipient since knowledge of the secret key, A'jv/, is required.
Where secrecy is absolutely necessary, which is the case in key distribution,
modulo two arithmetic used in the following manner.

token = KMACkm

® ^'^s

The token is transmitted and a random, 64 bit session key, A'5, is is gener-
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ated. To recover K s , requires the recreation oiKMACR-j^. In KryptoKnight
the message used to create K M A C k m ^^ Publicly known thus the intended
recipient of the token must know Km which is a secret.

6.3.2

KryptoKnight Ticket

As stated previously the KryptoKnight authentication system is based on
sharing of secret keys between the AS and each principal. When two principals wish to communicate, they must obtain a secret, key that they can share
(a so called session key). Usually the initiator of the communication applies
to the AS for a ticket which contains the session key. As in Kerberos, the
ticket is encrypted in a way such that the session key can be obtained by
the two communicating principals and no one else. The encryption method,
however, does differ, see Section 6.3.1.
The ticket consists of a number of clear text fields and an encrypted token.
In the following ticket field summary, the client, c, is the principal applying
for the ticket. The server, s, is the third party with whom the client wishes
to converse. The AS is the ticket issuing authority and the ticket is being
issued for the client. We can summarize the principals involved and their
roles thus:
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Ticket Reader

Client c.

Ticket Issuer

The Authentication Server AS.

Third Party

Server s.

The protocol used to obtain the ticket is described in Section 6.3.4.

The

ticket format is:

Nr, Ni, s, time,

token

where:

Nr

A 64 bit nonce generated by the client.

Ni

A 64 bit nonce generated by the AS. This nonce is
created using a keyed one-way function and using Ni
as its input.
Name of the third party, in this case the server.

time

The time after which the ticket is no longer valid. That
is the ticket expiration time.

token

64 bit encrypted token which contains the following:

KM AC {Ni ® 5, Nr, Ni ®
where:

time}^^^^

® K^,,
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The reader's key is the secret key shared between the

KAS,C

client and the AS;
K^ ^

The session key which will be shared by the client and
the server.

To recover the session key requires knowledge of the secret key

6.3.3

KAS,C

Single Sign-On
t

The KryptoKnight system requires the user to login to the network in a
similar fashion to time share machines. The purpose of the initial exchange
is to perform a uniform, network wide login of the user (see Figure 6.3). In
Kerberos this pre-authentication function is fulfilled by the initial exchange
between the user and the KDC. The procedure in the KryptoKnight is very
similar and can be summarized as follows.

1. c

AS: u

The user informs the authentication server, AS, of his (or her) desire
to login. The client, of course, is acting on the user's behalf.

The

message consists of only the user's name (u) and is sent in plaintext.

2.

c: T.^TAS

The AS reply, which contains two tickets, is essentially designed to
distribute a session key to be used by the AS and the client. Knowledge
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AUTHENTICATION

SERVER

CUENT

SERVER

Figure 6.3: KryptoKnight Single Sign-On Protocol
of this session key would subsequently be taken as proof of identity.
Tc is designed to be read by the client and contains the client's copy
of the session key. The ticket's content can be summarized thus (refer
to Section 6.3.2):

Ticket Reader

^

Client c;

Ticket Issuer

—^

The Authentication Server AS;

Third Party

The Authentication Server AS;

Reader's Key

A'^. The key shared by the client and AS;

Session Key

^

Kc,as- TO be used by the client and AS.

The second ticket, Tas, is stored by the client and is sent to the AS
each time client wishes to converse with the AS. The ticket contents is
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as follows:

Ticket Reader

The Authentication Server AS;

Ticket Issuer

The Authentication Server AS;

Third Party

The user;

Reader's Key

Kas- The key shared by the client and AS;

Session Key

^

Kc,AS- To be used by the client and AS.

The ticket obtained by the user is subsequently used to run process on his
(or her) behalf.

6.3.4

Obtaining Service

Once the user has successfully completed the login process, he (or she) may
wish to obtain some service. To initiate a communication with a server (or
any other network entity), the user must obtain a ticket for that server. In
this section we describe the steps required for a client to initiate such a conversation. In doing so the client will be required to use both the Two Party
Authentication and Key Distribution services from the AS. The process is
illustrated in Figure 6.4.

1. clients

server: u^Nc,Tc

The client requests service by presenting its users name, w, and the
freshly generated nonce Nc. The ticket T^ was obtained during the user
$
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AUTHENTICATION SERVER

SERVER

CLIENT

Figure 6.4: KryptoKnight - Obtaining Service.
pre-authentication process and will be required by the AS to extract
the session key it shares with the client. This message initiates the
authentication and key distribution process. Section 6.3.3 explains the
pre-authentication process.

2. servers

AS: u,

Ns.T^

The server generates its own nonce, Ns and forwards it together with
its name,

its ticket, T^, and the information it received from the

client to the AS. The ticket,

was obtained by the server during its

pre-authentication process which is similar to that under gone by the
user. Once again the ticket, T^, is required to allow the AS to identify
the server and extract the key that it shares with the server.

82CHAPTER

3. AS

6. AUTHENTICATION

AND KEY

DISTRIBUTION

SYSTEMS

server: Tc,s,Ts,c, NAS

T h e AS uses the nonce to generate two tickets, one for the server, Tg^c
and the other to be forwarded to the client Tc,s- These are returned
to the server together with a nonce,iV^5 generated by AS.

The two

tickets contain the same random session key which the A S generated.
T h e tickets are enciphered so that only the intended principal can
extract the session key.

4. server => client: T^T^, NAS, Ns, KMACcs{Nc,

N^, Nc ® s)

T h e server sends the client á message in two parts:
• t
•

TC,T,,Nas
T h e first three fields are part of the key distribution protocol.
T h e server forwards the tickets and the nonce to the client.

•

KMACcsiNc,

N,, N^ 0

server)

T h e remaining fields are part of the authentication protocol. T h e
server is able to decipher its own ticket using the key it shares
with AS.

It then uses the session key contained in the ticket

as the key in the K M A C function. It sends the result together
with, Ns, the nonce it generated earlier.

This second message

component is to prove the server's identity, since only the server
could have extracted the session key.

5. client

server:

KMACCS{NC,

NS), KMACC{NC,

NAS)

T h e client uses the key it shares with the authentication server t o
decipher the ticket's contents.

If the server's identity is acceptable,
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the client sends a message to prove its identity. The first component
of the message is an authenticator for the server. The server will be
able to accept the client's claim as the KMAC requires knowledge of
the session key.
The second message component is created for the server to forward
to the AS on the client's behalf. It uses the secret key shared by
the client and the AS and is to confirm the chent's completion of the
authentication process.
6. server ^

AS:

KMACDNC,

NAS). KMACS{NS.

NAS) •

The server, after it has confirmed the client's identity, constructs a
authenticator for the AS. This final exchange confirms to the AS the
both parties have received the session key and have authenticated each
other.

6.3.5

O b s e r v a t i o n s on K r y p t o K n i g h t

KryptoKnight is fairly recent compared with Kerberos, hence very little
work has been done on its analysis. However we can make the foUowing
observation.

Message Integrity

In Section 5.4.3 we explained the use of a one-way hash function to ensure
data integrity. Briefly, if two principals are communicating, then encryption
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can be used to ensure privacy. However, if the message contains a random
portion then it is not possible for tlie recipient to be sure of message integrity,,
merely by examining it.
Within the KryptoKnight a key distribution ticket consists of a number of
clear-text fields and an encrypted token.

The token is used to hide the

session key thus:

token = K M AC Km{cleartextf

ields) ® Kg
i

where Kg is 64 bits in length and has been selected to be random.

The

KM AC appears random but is calculated using clear-text fields and the
recipients secret key. To recover the session key the intended recipient is
expected to recreate the KMAC field.

However, if an adversary were to

change the ticket's expiration time field, a false key will be recovered. The
recipient has no way of checking the key's integrity. Thus, the recipient is
left with no option but to proceed with the protocol and assume the key is
correct. This weakness in the protocol can be eliminated by the inclusion of
a MDC as suggested in section 5.4.3.

Chapter 7

Beacons
The use of a Beacon as a security service within a distributed computer
system was first suggested by M. Rabin [30] in 1983. Rabin's novel ideas on
the use of Beacons have been largely overlooked by the research community
during the past decade. In this chapter we wish to revive these ideas in order
to apply them to the problems of communication security. In the following
section we will briefly describe Rabin's idea to place Beacons in their proper
historical prospective. In the sections that foUow we will modify Rabin's
ideas so that the Beacon may be used to provides a new security service for
communicating principals.
This chapter is included in the paper:
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Beacon based authentication. In Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
ORICS'94),

Brighton,

(ES-

UK, Nov 1994, accepted for publication by Lecture
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1994.

7.1

Rabin's Approach Using Beacons

Rabin defined a Beacon as emitting, at regular interval, a random integer
sealed using a suitable cryptographic signature system. The integer would be
selected randomly and uniformly within the range 1 to N, where N is publicly
known. With this basic concept he proposed two probabilistic protocols, one
for the signing of contracts and the second for information disclosure. In the
following section Rabin's use of Beacons is illustrated by briefly outlining
the contract signing protocol. For a full account, the reader is referred to
the original paper.

7.1.1

The Contract Signing Problem

Suppose, Alice is selling her house and Bob is interested in purchasing it.
They have negotiated a contract over a computer network and are ready to
exchange signed copies. It is not possible for them to meet and they wish
to exchange contracts electronically using the network. We can assume that
the contracts can be signed by an suitable electronic signature scheme.
The problem addressed by Rabin was, if Alice signs and sends the contract
to Bob, then Alice is committed, but Bob is not. Bob could take the opportunity to look for a better deal, leaving Alice vulnerable. A similar argument
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can be made about Bob.

7.1.2

Contract Signing Using a Beacon

In Rabin's protocol we can assume the following initial conditions:

• Each of the participants has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair
which can be used for signing messages and verifying signatures. The
Beacon has the private and public key pair
^AIYA

«i-nd Bob's are

XBIYQ.

XBJSJ.YBN-,

The public keys,

Alice's keys are

YQN-, YA ^ND ^B ARE

widely known and are available to the participants. Each participant's
private keys has been kept secret and known only to its owner.
• The Beacon broadcasts a token, T, every A seconds and the next
broadcast will be at time i + A. The T has the following form:

T =

{t,i}xBN

where t is the time at which the token was emitted and i is a randomly
selected integer between 1 and iV. The value of N is publicly known.
The Beacon seals the token using its private key XBNAlice and Bob have agreed to the contract name, C, such that:

C = h{contract)
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where a suitable hash function h is applied to the text of the contract
and the obtained result is used to denote the contract.

• Alice and Bob have agreed and signed preliminary agreements. We
will refer to these agreements signed by Alice and Bob as Pa and P^
respectively. The text of Pa is as follows:
{ If Bob can produce (C, T) signed by Alice and T signed by the Beacon
for some token T, then I, Alice will be committed to the contract as of
the time t mentioned in the token T.
Bob signs a similar contract with the name Alice and Bob exchanged.
Since this agreement does not bind either parties to the contract, it
reasonable to assume that this initial exchange will pass off without
incident.

The protocol for the exchange of contracts requires that both parties follow
a timed sequence. The exchange is aborted if one party fails to transmit
the specified message within the allocated time. The exchange takes place
in the time between Beacon broadcasts. This time A is divided in six equal
segments. The protocol is as follows:

7.1: RABIN'S APPROACH

1.

t < time

USING

<t+lA

BEACONS

Alice

2.

Bob: Pa

Bob => Alice: Pb

3.

i + iA < time

<t+\A

Alice =i> Bob:

4.

t+\A<

<t+^A

Bob

time

Alice: zjg

i = i^ + ismoclN

5.

6.
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i + ^A < time

<t+^A

Alice
Bob

7.

Bob: { C , 2 , i +
Alice: {C,i,t

+

Ajx^

Within the first segment (hnes 1 and 2) the two parties are required to
exchange the preliminary contract. In the next two segments both Alice and
Bob exchange a random number that each has generated independently, that
is iA and is-

Each party is then able to calculate i. Last, (lines 6 and 7)

the two parties sign and exchange the messages that could bind them to the
contract. These messages contain the contract name, C , and possibly the
next token. If neither party has cheated and the next token emitted by the
Beacon contains

then both parties are committed to the contract at the

same time. If the next emitted token does not contain 2, then neither parties
are committed and steps 3 to 7 have to be repeated. Rabin showed that in
such an exchange there is a probability of 1/N that one of the parties could
cheat successfully.
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7.2

Beacons for Secure Communication

A Beacon, within the context of secure communications, is a service that is
provided by a secure host in a computer network. The Beacon broadcasts,
at regular intervals, a nonce encapsulated within a certified token.

The

emitted token would be accessible to all hosts on the network and each host
maintains a short list of fresh tokens. The additional load caused by this
service would be small as each host is only required to listen for a short and
relatively infrequent message. The following is a more detailed description
of the concept, feasibihty and implementation of a Beacon.

7.2.1

t

Token

The token has the following form:

Ni,time,life,{MDC}xb

where:
Ni

is a freshly generated nonce.

time

is the time at which the token was emitted.

life

is the time after which the token will not be valid.

MDC

is the Manipulation Detection Code.

Xbn

is the Beacon's secret encryption key which is used to certify the token.

Each host which receives the token is able to verify its validity by decrypting
the MDC using the Beacon's public key. The MDC insures that the token
has not been tampered with. Since the token is signed with the Beacon's
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secret key it is reasonable to assume the token originated from tiie Beacon.
Each host is able to maintain, on behalf of its principals, a short list of
currently valid tokens. Thus these tokens are available to all principals to
use in the authentication process.

7.2.2

Network Synchronization

There is reliance within a Beacon based system on each principal having
access to a stable clock and that these clocks are to some extent synchronized.
Since the life of a token can be relatively long, say an hour, differences of a
few seconds between the hosts can be tolerated. In this section we examine
the Internet's Network Time Protocol (NTP) to show that in fact it is feasible
to have much closer synchronization between communication hosts.
Any attempt to synchronize communicating entities requires access to an
accurate standard.

Since 1972 the time standard for the world has been

based on International Atomic Time which is currently maintained to an
accuracy of a few parts in

[2]. Many countries operate standard time

and frequency broadcast stations which collectively cover most areas of the
world.
The network time protocol (NTP) is an Internet standard protocol [31] which
is used to maintain a network of time servers, accessible over normal Internet
paths. Even though transmission delays over Internet can vary widely, due
to fluctuations in traffic loads and dynamic message routing, NTP acts to
provide global synchronization. NTP is built on Internet's User Datagram
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Protocol (UDP) [28] which provides a connectionless transport mechanism
over a wide and dispersed network which requires stable local clocks.
The NTP system consists of a network of primary servers and an estimated
total of over 2000 secondary time servers. Primary time servers are directly
synchronized by reference source, usually a timecode receiver, or a calibrated
atomic clock. Secondary time servers are synchronized by either a primary
server or another secondary time server. Due to the wide dispersal of these
servers, access is available using some thousands of routes over hundreds of
networks, making the system very reliable.
.--IV

'

In a typical configuration used at the University of Illinois and the University
of Delaware, the institutions operate three campus servers. These servers are
synchronized using two primary servers and each other. The three campus
servers in turn provide synchronization for department servers which then
deliver time to remaining hosts. In such a configuration synchronization of
several hundred milliseconds-seconds would not be uncommon.

7.2.3

Creating a Beacon

As stated above, a Beacon is a service which, at regular intervals, emits a
token which can be authenticated. The emitted token must be accessible
to all hosts on the network and each host is required to maintain a short
list of fresh tokens. Since the broadcast is short and relatively infrequent,
implementation is quite feasible in either software or hardware. Algorithm
1 shows the functionality.
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Beaconf)

1. t =

clockA

2. Ni = G{)
3. MDCi

=

h{t,life,Ni)

4. T = t , l i f e , N i , { M D C ^ } x n N
5. while {clock < t) wait
6. broadcast(T)
7. g o t o ( l )

end

The algorithm begins by setting, t, the time for the next broadcast. Next,
the token is constructed prior to broadcasting (lines 2 to 4). The cryptographically strong pseudo-random generator, G(), is used to create a nonce
Ni. The final component required to create the token is the manipulation
detection code (MDC). The one-way hash function, /i, is employed to compress the bit string created by the concatenation of the broadcast time, t,
the token life, I and the nonce Ni. The output, which is of a fixed length, is
used as the MDC. The token, T, consists of the MDC, M D C i , signed with
the Beacon's private key and the other three fields. The token is broadcast
at time t (lines 5 and 6). The algorithm is then repeated (line 7).
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One-time Token

It is generally accepted that the beneficial features of a public key cryptographic system are bought at the expense of speed. At present it is not
feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption. In practice, however,
it is quite desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key system
is used for authentication and distribution of a session key. The session key
would then be used by the two principals to communicate securely using a
symmetric key system.
With a Beacon based system, a "one-time token" can be used to simplify
the process. A one-time token it is a token emitted by the Beacon which
can be used only once to obtain service from a particular server; much like
an admission ticket to a theatre. Once the token has been presented, it is
marked and will not be accepted by that server on any subsequent occasion.
The task of marking tokens is much easier for the server than maintaining
a database of prior requests.

The use of one-time tokens eliminates the
»

possibility of a replay attack and thus simplifies the authentication process.
To illustrate the process consider a very simple case. Alice wishes to communicate securely with Bob. In this case Bob can be thought of as being
the server and Alice the chent. Assume, for simplicity, that AHce and Bob
communicated yesterday and they are both certain that each knows the
other's public key. Such an occurrence is not uncommon in a distributed
system' since most principals communicate within a small group and cache
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is commonly used to store commonly used keys. The process licis two steps:

1. Alice

Bob: AHce,A^-,{A'^^Jy^,

Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message wliich contains,
her name, the nonce Ni, and a session key KA,B- The session key is
created by Alice, and it is to be used with a symmetric cryptographic
system, to secure subsequent messages. Since the session key is the
secret in the message, it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's
public key, Yg. The nonce, Ni, is selected at random by Alice from
the list of active tokens and ensures message freshness. The message
integrity is protected using a MDC which is signed by Alice.

2. Bob

Alice: {Ni}K^ B

Bob having received the request for communication can confirm that
the message did come from Ahce and that it has not been altered. The
freshness of the message is guaranteed by the use of a nonce, Ni, which
was recently broadcast by the Beacon. Since the nonce can be used
only once there is of course a finite probability that the nonce chosen
by the Alice from the active list has already been presented to Bob by
someone else. In such a case the request would be rejected and Alice
would have to re-apply with an other nonce. The probability of such a
collision occurring is dependent on factors such as network load, token
frequency and token life. In a practical applications the additional load
caused by this effect should be minimal.
Having received a session key which he can trust, Bob completes the
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protocol by authenticating himself to Alice. He enciphers the nonce
with a session key and sends it to Alice. Since only Bob could have
obtained the session key, the message proves Bob's identity.

Chapter 8

Beaconizing the Needham
and Schroeder Protocol

The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol [24] is arguably one of the best
known authentication and key distribution protocols. It has been the basis of
a number of systems that use the nonce to prove freshness. In 1981 Denning
and Sacco [11] pointed out a weakness in the NS protocol and suggested
the use of time-stamped certificates to guard against a replay attack. Since
that time authentication protocols have been divided into two groups, one
preferring the use of nonces and the other preferring time-stamps.

In this section we briefly outline the NS protocol using asymmetric keys.
Next we will describe the weakness pointed out by Denning and Sacco and
their solution to the problem. We will then modify the NS protocol to take
advantage of a Beacon. We will show that the modified protocol simplifies
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the solution to the authentication problem and has advantages over both the
NS protocol and modified protocol suggested by Denning and Sacco.
This chapter is included in the paper:
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Beacon based authentication. In Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
ORICS'94),

(ES-

Brighton, UK, Nov 1994, accepted for publication by Lecture

Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelb erg-New York,
1994.

8.1

Needham and Schroeder Protocol

The NS protocol requires a trusted authentication server (AS) to establish
trust between two principals wishing to communicate. Each principal within
a realm which is dominated by a particular AS, is required to register his
public key with that AS. To establish trust between principals, the AS must
have the trust of all principals within its realm, to maintain and distribute
these keys reliably.
The NS protocol can be divided into distinct sections. The first is the public
key distribution protocol which is used by a principal to communicate with
the AS in order to obtain a public key belonging to another principal. The
second is the connection protocol which is used by two principals to establish
an coiwersation and authenticate each other. The following illustrates the
two protocol sections.
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Public K e y Distribution Protocol
Consider the situation where Alice wishes to communicate with Bob but is
not certain of his public key. Thus she must apply to the AS to obtain Bob's
public key. The steps required are illustrated in Figure 8.1.

AUTHENTICATION SERVER

/ ^
ALICE

\

•

BOB

Figure 8.1: The Needham and Schroeder Fubhc Key Distribution Protocol

1. Alice

AS: Alice,Bob

Alice sends a message to the AS requesting the pubhc key of the named
principal; that is Bob's public key. The requesting message is in clear
text and also contains the identity of the requesting principal; that is
Alice.
2. AS

AHce: {Bob,yB}A',

The AS responds with a message containing the requested public key
and is signed with the AS's private key. The message contains the name
of the key's owner which allows Alice to verify that the reply contains
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the correct key. Since the reply contains no secret information, it is
only signed by the AS.

This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance that the request was
initiated by Alice or the freshness of the AS's reply.
Connection Protocol
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain any required keys
from the AS, the following are the steps required for them to authenticate
each other in order to establish a conversation. Alice is the initiator (see
Figure 8.2).

Figure 8.2: The Needham and Schroeder Connection Protocol

1. Alice

Bob: {iV^,Alice}y^

Knowing Bob's public key, Alice is able initiate the authentication
process by sending Bob a message which contains a nonce, NA, and

PROTOCOL

8.2.

PROTOCOL

WEAKNESS

101

her identity. The message is enciphered with Bob's public key, YB,
which means only Bob will be able to access NA2. Bob

Alice: { N A , N B } Y ^

On receiving the message, Bob is able to obtain the nonce NA- However, Bob cannot be certain of freshness nor who the actual sender
is. To verify the sender's identity and guard against a replay attack,
Bob generates a nonce, NB, and sends it to Alice. Bob also takes the
opportunity to prove his identity to Alice by including NA in the reply.
The message to Alice is encrypted with Alice's public key.
3. Alice

Bob: {iVfily^

As a final step in this authentication process, Alice proves her identity
to Bob by returning NB-

Even though both principals are certain of the other's public key, the three
step authentication process is still required to ensure freshness and guard
against a replay attack.

8.2

Protocol Weakness

In [11] Denning and Sacco analyzed the protocol and pointed out that it is
only secure while there hasn't been a key compromise. To examine the weakness let us suppose that an adversary, Charles, has managed to obtain Alice's
private key. Also he has been able to record past conversations between the
AS, Bob and Alice. Charles is able to use these to maintain confidence in
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Alice's compromised key. He does this by replaying an old response by the
AS to requests for Alice's public key. The replay of course distributes the
compromised key. To illustrate, the following shows how Charles is able to
trick Bob.

1. Bob

AS: Alice,Bob

The Bob sends a message to the AS requesting Alice's public key.

2. Charles

Bob:

{Alice,Y^}x^AS

Charles intercepts the message and replies to the request by replaying
an old key distribution message. Since the reply is signed by the'AS,
Bob is tricked into accepting the message and thus the compromised
key, y ; .

Since the key distribution message never expires and does not contain the
name of the requesting principal, Charles will be to trick any principal within
the realm until the AS changes its key pair. Not only is Charles able to
masquerade as Alice but also by blocking the distribution of her new key, he
can deny her any service he chooses.

8.3

Denning and Sacco's Modification

The solution suggested Denning and Sacco uses time stamped certificates.
The form of these certificates is as follows:
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DENNING AND SACCO'S MODIFICATION

{J',Yp,Th-

AS

where:
P

—^

is the principal's identification.

Vp

is the public key belonging to principal P.

T

— » i s the time at which the certificate was issued.
is the AS's private key which is used to sign the certificate.

Xas

The Denning and Sacco modified protocol combines the authentication and
key distribution into a single process. That is, if the principals are able to
t

obtain public keys reliably and miessage freshness can be guaranteed, then
the communicating principals are able to use the features of their public key
cryptographic system to authenticate messages. The steps of the modified
protocol are illustrated in Figure 8.3.

AUTHENTICATION SERVER

AUCE

— ^

,

bob

Figure 8.3: The Denning and Sacco Modified Protocol
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AS: Alice,Bob

As before tlie Alice sends a message to the AS. However this request
is for two certificates, one containing Bob's public key and the other
containing Alice's public key. The later is intended to enable Bob to
securely obtain Alice's public key.

2. AS

Alice: C'a.Cb

The AS responds with a message continuing two signed certificates.
Ca contains Alice's public key and Cb contains Bob's.
3. Alice

Bob:

Ca,Cb
t

Alice initiates the conversation with Bob by sending the certificates
she obtained from the AS. Since the certificates are signed by the AS
and contain a time-stamp to prove freshness, Bob is able to trust them.

In [11] Denning and Sacco point out that in order for Alice to obtain the
certificates and deliver them to Bob, the certificates must have a lifetime.
By this it is meant, the certificates must be valid for a duration of time. The
length of the certificate lifetime would depend on factors such as synchronization discrepancy between hosts and communication delays. During this
period the protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack. Thus if the certificate
lifetime is kept short, the protocol reduces the likelihood of a replay attack,
but it does not eliminate it.

Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer
able to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be
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kept short to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all
conversations.

8.4

A Beacon Based Approach

We now introduce a Beacon to the distributed system and modify the NS
protocol to take advantage of the new service. As in the unmodified NS
protocol, the beaconized protocol can be divided into two sections.

The

first enables a principal to obtain another's public key. The second, the
connection protocol, is used by a principal to initiate a conversation. We'end
this section by modifying the connection protocol to include the distribution
of a symmetric session key. Once again we will use the over worked principals,
Alice and Bob, to demonstrate the protocol features.
Public Key Distribution Protocol
The following are the steps required for Alice to obtain Bob's public key (see
Figure 8.4).

1. Alice

AS: Alice,Bob

Alice sends a message to the AS stating her name is Alice and requesting Bob's public key. The message is in plaintext and only contains
the two identities.
2. AS

Alice: Boh,YB,Ni, ( M D C j x ^ s

Since the reply to Alice contains no secret information, the message
is not enciphered.

As in the NS protocol the message contains the
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AUTHENTICATION SERVER
#

1

BEACON
, • •.

/

ALICE

•

BOB

Figure 8.4: The Beacon Based Public Key Distribution Protocol
requested public key and the name of the key's owner. This ensures
that the request made by Alice has not been altered. The nonce, Ni,
is picked randomly by the Beacon from the list of active tokens and
is used to guarantee that this message is not a replay. The message
integrity is ensured by the MDC which is signed by the AS.

Since the Beacon based system uses the concept of a "one-time token", if Ni
has previously been presented to Alice, then it would have been marked and
consequently the AS's reply would be rejected. In such circumstances, Alice
would have to reinitated the request. The probability of such a collision
occurring, in a practical application, is quite low.
Connection Protocol
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain the required keys,
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the following is the step required for Alice to initiate a conversation (see
Figure 8.5).

.•••

AUTHENTICATION SERVER

BEACON

* .

^ .

1

AT ICE

BOB
1

Figure 8.5: The Beacon Based Public Key Distribution Protocol

1. AUce ^ Bob: A]lce,Ni,{MDC}x^
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains
her name and the nonce, Ni. The nonce is selected at random by
Alice from the list of active tokens and is used to ensures message
freshness. The message integrity is protected using a MDC which is
signed by Alice. Since the message contains no secret information it is
not encrypted with Bob's public key.

If Ni has previously been presented to Bob, then it would have been marked
and the request for connection would be rejected. In such an event Bob
would reply with an error message and Alice would select another nonce and
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reinitiate the request.
Distribution of a Symmetric key.
At present it is not feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption.
Thus, it is quite desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key
system is used for authentication and distribution of a session key.

The

session key would then be used by the two principals to communicate securely
using a symmetric key system. We now modify the protocol to allow the
two principals, Alice and Bob, to share a session key.

1. Alice

Bob: AHce,iV,,

Alice would initiate such an exchange by sending Bob a message containing her name, the nonce TV,-, and the session key, Ka,B' Once again
Ni is used to ensure freshness. Since the session key is the only secret
in the message, it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's public key, Ffi.The message integrity is protected using a MDC which is
signed by Alice.

8.5

Attacks on the Modified Protocol

The attacks that can be launched against the beaconized protocol can be
broken up in to six categories. In the foUowing section the effects of these
are discussed in turn.

• -In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of
the principals in the system. Since the principal's secret key is used
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to prove its identity, for such an attack to succeed an adversary would
require knowledge of such a key. If a principal's secret key were to
be compromised, it is possible that an adversary could masquerade
as that principal while the problem was undetected and thus before a
new key is distributed. However unlike the NS protocol, an adversary
is unable to block the distribution of new keys.

• By eavesdropping (or monitoring) network traffic, an adversary hopes
to gain some advantage or learn some secret. Since the public key
protocol does not require the transmission of any secret information,
such an attack cannot succeed. In the case of the hybrid system, the
session key is enciphered. Thus an adversary would require knowledge
of the deciphering key.

• The goal of a replay attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowledge by retransmitting a message that was intercepted earlier. There
are three distinct areas in which a replay attack could be attempted.
They are:

1. The token transmitted by the Beacon. The purpose of this message is to broadcast a unique token to all hosts on the network.
Since the token has a finite life, if an expired token were retransmitted, the message would simply be discarded. Replaying the
message before the token expires gains no advantage for the adversary as the duplicate token would be detected and thus discarded.
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2. The second attempt could be made against the public key distribution portion of the protocol. The protocol consists of two
messages. The effect of replaying these would be:
- The protocol is initiated by a principal requesting another
principal's public key. The request is in plaintext and is directed to the AS. Since the information is public and the service is freely available, the adversary can gain nothing new.
- The reply from the AS contains the requested public key. The
message is unique. It contains the name of the recipient, a
i

one-time nonce and is signed by the sender, hence a replayed
message would be detected.
3. The final message that could be replayed is the request for connection. This message is also unique, thus a replayed message
would be detected and the attack would fail.
• A m.odification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets
as they travel across the computer network. For such an attack to
succeed the change must be undetected.

Such an attack would be

futile because the recipient of a message is always able to detect any
changes.

• An attempt to delay authentication messages would cause the token to
expire and prevent the principal from completing the authentication
process.
service".

Such an attack would have the same results as "denial of
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• A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary that is
able to hinder communications is some manner. Detection and countering such an attack is best dealt with by other means such as statistical
monitoring of the network.

8.6

Discussion of Advantages

In this section we discuss the advantages gained by use of a beaconized approach over the NS protocol or the time base protocol suggested by Denning
and Sacco.
The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol has been the basis for a number
of systems.

The approach taken by them requires principals, wishing to

establish a conversation, to engage in a three step message exchange. The
purpose of this exchange is to ascertain the identity of the other principal
and to guard against a replay attack. The distribution of public keys is
provided by a trusted authentication server, AS. In the worst case, where
both principals require the services of the AS to obtain public keys, the
protocol requires a total of seven messages to be exchanged.
In [11], Denning and Sacco pointed out that the NS protocol is vulnerable to
a replay attack in the event that a principal's key is compromised. To overcome this difficulty, Denning and Sacco suggested the use of time-stamped
certificates. The resulting protocol requires a principal who wishes to initiate a conversation, to contact the AS to obtain two certificates; one for each
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principal. Each certificate has a finite life and contains a public key. One
benefit of this approach is that the number of messages required to initiate
a conversation is reduced to three. However, during the period between the
certificate being issued and expiring, the modified protocol is also vulnerable to a replay attack. The protocol does not eliminate the possibility of a
replay attack, but reduces it.
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer
able to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be
kept short to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all
conversations. This means that a greater amount of trust is invested in the
AS and the realm now has a single point of failure.
The fundamental difference between our approach is the use of a Beacon to
deliver a "one-time token" to each host. This simplifies the authentication
process by taking advantage of the features of a public key cryptographic
system. In contrast to the modification proposed by Denning and Sacco,
the beaconized approach eliminates the possibility of a replay attack, allows
principals to cache commonly used keys and reduces the role of the AS to a
"key look-up service".
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Chapter 9

Concluding Remarks

9.1

Summary

This work has been motivated by the universal concern being expressed by
users of large open networks such as the Internet. Currently, there are an estimated twenty million users who use the Internet in seventy countries. The
Internet is used to carry data from a variety of sources including research organizations, government bodies and business. Increasingly, the information
being transmitted is sensitive and concerns about data privacy and integrity
are growing. New users are estimated to be joining the Internet community
at between 15 to 20 percent per month [18 .

In chapters two through to four we examined these concerns and gained
a better understanding of the internet environment.

In the next chapter

we examined some of the primitive security services that can be used to
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provide solutions for communicating entities. It is safe to say the reliable
authentication of communicating entities is essential for achieving security
in a distributed computing environment.
The design of such systems as Kerberos [40, 19, 4], SPX [42] and more recently KryptoKnight [22] and Kuperee [15], have largely been successful in
addressing the problem. In chapter six we examined two of these systems,
Kerberos and KryptoKnight. The common element with these implementations is the need for a trusted third-party authentication service.

This

essentially requires a great deal of trust to be invested in the authentication
t

server which adds a level of complexity and reduces, system flexibility.
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties was
first suggested by M. Rabin in [30]. In chapter seven we revive Rabin's ideas
which have been largely overlooked for the past decade. In particular we
present a novel approach to the authentication problem based on a service
called Beacon which continuously broadcasts certified nonces. We showed
that this approach considerably simplifies authentication and key distribution.
In chapter eight we illustrated the impact of such a service by "Beaconizing" the well know Needham and Schroeder protocol. We showed that the
modified protocol simplifies authentication and key distribution and has advantages over both the Needham and Schroeder [24] protocol and modified
protocol suggested by Denning and Sacco [11]. We believe our solution wiU
have wide applications in tranborder network protocols due to the ellmina-
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tion of replay attacks and its increased efficiency.

9.2

Future Considerations

In this section we discuss some of the issues and items for future work which
we hope will include implementation.

9.2.1

Inter-Realm Support

Within the Internet, individual computers and workstations are connected
t

together by a Local Area Network (LAN). The LAN is likely to span a
building or part of a building, allowing the individual hosts to communicate
and share resources locally. Typically, these LANs may be connected to
a site backbone which interconnects the individual LANs within a single
site.

Such architectures are commonly found within University campuses

and building complexes. The Beacon based protocol presented in this thesis
is highly suited to such a single realm environment.
Connections beyond the site are provided by a Wide Area Network (WAN).
Unlike LANs, WANs are used for long-haul services and consist of a collection of links that are connected by gateways. These gateways are dispersed
over a large geographical area. Currently, the Beacon based protocol has no
provision for the support of communications between individual sites. However, a number of inter-realm authentication protocols have already been
designed.

The beaconization of such a system may provide a natural ex-
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tension. The manner in which a system of inter-realm Beacons would be
organized, remains an open problem.

9.2.2

Identity Based Cryptographic Schemes

In 1984, Shamir [37] introduced the concept of an identity based cryptographic system. In such a system a user is required to register with a trusted
Key Generation Centre (KGC) as a part of the process of joining a community of networked principals. The user, if accepted by the KGC, would be
issued with a secret key. This secret key would be constructed, by the KGC,
in such a manner that the user's identity can be used as his (or her) public
key. It can be assumed that the user's identity is unique and is available to
other principals within the community.
Since then a great deal of work has been done and various schemes have
been put forward (eg. [16, 27, 43]). There exist a tantalizing possibility of
applying a Beacon to such a scheme, there by eliminating the need for an
Authentication Server.

9.2.3

Implementation of a Secure Systems

The requirements associated with the development of any system can be
placed in two broad categories [14]. The first, comprises those requirements
that are associated with the system's functionality, that is, the characteristic
goals which must achieved by the development process. These may include
such items as the number of messages the system must process per second.
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or the characteristics of the file access mechanism.

The second category

comprises those requirements that are levied against the development process by the organization's procedures. Items such as specifications, plans,
configuration management and test procedure, would fall into this category.
For the development of a system that could be considered to be verify ably
secure, additional constraints are placed on both of the above categories.
Published guidelines (eg.

[25, 26]) have aided in providing a better un-

derstanding of the goals which have to be met by a secure system.

The

fundamental requirement of a secure system is to provide an increased level
of assurance for users. The increased assurance is obtained via increased
understanding of the design and implementation.

Currently, a great deal of effort is being directed toward providing appropriate specification methodology, verification tools and security modeling.
An implementation of a Beacon based system could be used as a vehicle to
extend these areas.
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Abstract.
Reliable authentication of communicating entities is essential for achieving security in a distributed computing environment. The design of such
systems as Kerberos, SPX and more recently KryptoKnight and Kuperee, have largely been successful in addressing the problem. The common element with these implementations is the need for a trusted thirdparty authentication service. This essentially requires a great deal of
trust to be invested in the authentication server which adds a level of
comple.xity and reduces system
fle>dbility.
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties
was first suggested by M. Rabin in "Transactions protected by beacons,"
Journal of Computer and System Sciences , Vol 27, pp 256-267, 1983. In
this paper we revive Rabin's ideas which have been largely overlooked in
the past decade. In particular we present a novel approach to the authentication problem based on a service called Beacon which continuously
broadcasts certified nonces. We argue that this approach considerably
simplifies the solution to the authentication problem and we illustrate
the impact of such a service by "Beaconizing" the well know Needham
and Schroeder protocol. The modified protocol would be suitable for deployment at upper layers of the communication stack.

j

Term Index: Beacon, Authentication, Network Security, Information Security, Security Protocol.

1

Introduction

In the past thirty years the rapid evolution of electronic data communication
has been breath taking. This growth and reliance on electronic communication
has increased concern about data privacy and integrity. Much effort is currently
being devoted to providing security services for a variety of communication environments. Authentication is universally acknowledged as being essential for
secure communications in a distributed system.
Informally, authentication is the capability of the recipient of a communication to be able to verify that the message did come from the alleged sender. As
a further requirement, it is usual to expect such systems to perform verification
over an open insecure network. This requirement constrains the authentication
system in the following manner:

-

Reliance must not be placed in the physical security of all hosts in the

distributed system.
- It should be assumed that packets traveling along the network can be read,
modified and inserted with little effort by an adversary.
- Trust cannot be based on the senders' address.
- Trust cannot be based on the senders' operating system security.
Currently, the dominant authentication protocols employed in a client-server
environment use a broker to arbitrate between principals who wish to communicate. In such a scheme, a principal must first contact the broker to obtain
credentials which can be trusted by its communicating partner. The protocol will
typically rely on an exchange of cryptographic messages and the participant's
knowledge of some secret. Well known examples of such systems are Kerberos
[2, 3, 7], SPX [4], KryptoKnight [5] and Kuperee [6].
In this paper we present a novel approach to the authentication problem for
a distributed computer system using a public key cryptographic system and we
introduce a new service called Beacon which has been inspired by Rabin [1]. A
Beacon broadcasts, at regular intervals, certified nonces which are accessible to
all hosts within the network. In section 3 we give a brief description of Rabin's
use of Beacons. In section 4 the approach taken in this paper is described.
As a means of contrasting the Beacon based approach to authentication with
the more established authentication protocols, in section 5 we "beaconize" the
very well known Needham and Schroeder public key protocol. We assume that
the reader is familiar with the basic philosophy of Needham and Schroeder. For
a complete description of the protocol we would direct the reader to [8].
In section 6 we discuss the advantages of the beaconized approach. The paper
finally closes in section 7 with some concluding remarks.

2

Conventions

Throughout this paper certain terms are used that may appear to be ambiguous
or new to readers. In the following section the use of these terms, in the context
of this document, are stated. This should avoid any difficulty caused by them
being used differently elsewhere.
2.1

Terminology

A ho si is a computer with a unique address that is connected to a computer
network.
The user is the human being who is using some services that are provided by the
network. All programs in the system are initiated by users. The main purpose
of authentication is to verify the identity of the users within a network.
A client is a program that runs on behalf of a user in order to request some

service that is available on a remote host. Since the client runs on a user's behalf, it assumes the user identity and privileges. Any action taken by a client is
said to have been carried out by the user.
The server is a program that provides a service to a client on the network.
It is usually installed by the system administrator and runs on behalf of the
system. A server remains active in a network for much longer than a client and
thus is given an identity. By this it is meant that each server is registered with
the system, in a similar manner to a user, and that it must prove its identity
before a client will accept it.
Any communicating network entity, that is client or server, can be referred to
as a principal.
A realm is organized in a hierarchical structure and has a strong analogy to
domains in Internet. A single authentication server, be it a Beacon or Thirdparty Authenticator, is responsible for all local principals. This collection of
network entities, the authentication server and its clients, are referred to CLS, a
realm. A client who wishes to obtain some service from a server within the same
realm would use the service to prove its identity.
2.2

Cryptographic Requirements

The Beacon bcised system relies on a public key (or asymmetric) cryptographic
system. Many such systems have been designed and examples of such schemes
can be found in [10, 11]. For the purpose of our discussions the system's cryptographic requirements can be simplified and kept generic.
A public key system differs from a secret key (or symmetric) system in that
each principal in the distributed system hcis a pair of keys. The calculation of
this private and public key pair, given the initial conditions, is easy. However,
it would be infeasible for an adversary who knows a public key to calculate the
secret key or the initial conditions. Each principal heis a private key which is
kept secret' and is only known to that principal. The corresponding public key
is made available to all other principals. In the remainder of this paper " { } z "
means encipher with key Z. The private and public key pair will be denoted as
"A'" and "Y" respectively and subscripts will be used to identify the associated
principal. Thus the Beacon would have a key pair Xen^Ybn, the principal,
Alice, would have the pair Xa.Ya while Bob would have Xb,YbThe advantage of a public key system is that it supports secrecy, authentication, and integrity. Communication secrecy is supported by the transformations:
M =
{{M]Ys)xe
That is, suppose Alice wishes send a secret message, M, to Bob. Then Alice
must have access Bob's public key and encipher the message, thus:
C={M}ys
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Alice sends Bob the cryptographic string C. On receipt Bob is able to employ
his private key to decipher the message.
{C}XS

=

{ { M } Y S } X S =

M

The encryption and decryption processes are easy using the appropriate keys.
However, it would be infeasible for an adversary to decipher C without the
private key XB, ensuring secrecy. Now, since YB is publicly known, Bob has no
way of being certain of the sender's identity. Thus authenticity has not been
assured using this method.
Authentication, using a public key system, is satisfied by the following transformation.

Alice is able to "sign" her message to Bob'by using her private key, XA
C = { M } X .

Bob is able to verify that the message could have only come from Alice by
deciphering the message using Alice's public key, YA, thus:

If the message is plain-text. Bob knows that C has in fact not been altered.
However, if the message, or any portion of the message, is a random string then it
may be difficult for Bob to ascertain that the message has not been altered merely
by examining it. For this reason it is more usual for Alice to employ a suitable
one-way hashing function (eg. [12, 13]) to produce a Message Authentication
Code (MAC). Alice would sign the MAC with her private key and append it to
the message. On receiving the message. Bob is able to reproduce the M A C in
order to confirm that the message is from Alice and that it has not been altered.
Finally, all three can be employed by Alice to communicate securely with Bob
thus:
C = { M , { M A C } X . } Y S

3

Rabin's Approach Using Beacons

The use of a Beacon as a security service within a distributed computer system
was first suggested by M. Rabin [1]. He defined a Beacon as emitting, at regular
interval, a random integer sealed using a suitable cryptographic signature system.
The integer would be selected randomly and uniformly within the range 1 to N,
where N is publicly known. With this basic concept he proposed two protocols
based on a probabilistic approach, one for the signing of contracts and the second
for information disclosure. In the following section Rabin's use of Beacons is
illustrated by briefly outlining the contract signing protocol. For a full account,
the reader is referred to the original paper.

Consider, Alice and Bob have negotiated a contract over a computer network
and are ready to exchange signed copies. It is not possible for them to meet and
they wish using the network to exchange electronically. We can assume that the
contracts can be signed by an suitable electronic signature scheme. The problem
addressed by Rabin was, if Alice signs and sends the contract to Bob, then Alice
is committed, but Bob is not. Bob could take the opportunity to look for a better
deal, leaving Alice vulnerable. A similar argument can be made about Bob.
In Rabin's protocol we can assume the following initial conditions:
-

Each of the participants has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair which can
be used for signing messages and verifying signatures. The Beacon has the
private and public key pair XBN,YBN,
Alice's keys are XA,YA
and Bob's
are XB,YB- The public keys, YBN, YA and YB are widely known and are
available to the participants. Each participant's private key has been kept
secret and is known only to its owner.
- The Beacon broadcasts a token, T every A seconds and the next broadcast
will be at time t
A. The T has the following form:
{T,I}XBN

where i is the time at which the token was emitted and i is a randomly
selected integer between 1 and N. The value of N is publicly known. The
Beacon seals the token using its private key XBN- Alice and Bob have agreed to the contract name, C, such that:
C =

h{coniract)

where a suitable hash function h is applied to the text of the contract and
the obtained result is used to denote the contract.
- Alice and Bob have agreed and signed preliminary agreements. We will refer
to these agreements signed by Alice and Bob as PA and PB respectively. The
text of PA is as follows:
{If Boh can produce (C,T) signed by Alice and T signed by the Beacon for
some token T, then I, Alice will be conimitied io the contract as of the time
t mentioned in the token T. jx^i
Bob signs a similar contract with the name Alice and Bob exchanged. Since
this agreement does not bind either parties to the contract, it reasonable to
assume that this initial exchange will pass oif without incident.
The protocol for the exchange of contracts requires that both parties follow
timed sequence. The exchange is aborted if one party fails to transmit the specified message within the allocated time. The exchange takes place in the time
between Beacon broadcasts. This time A is divided in six equal segment. The
protocol is as follows:

1. i > time
2.

Alice
Bob: Pa
Bob => Alice: Pb

<t+

3. i +

> time < < +

4. i +
5.

> time

6. t-\-iA>
7.

time

Alice

Bob: iA

<t+^A Bob ^ Alice: is
i = iA + iBmodN
<t-{-^A Alice
Bob

Bob: { C , i , t +
Alice: { C , i,t +

A}xA
A}xb

Within the first segment (lines 1 and 2) the two parties are required to
exchange the preliminary contract. In the next two segments both Alice and
Bob exchange random number that each has generated independently, that is
¡A and is. Each party is then able to calculate i. Final, (lines 6 and 7) the two
parties sign and exchange the messages that could bind them to the contract.
These messages contain the contract name, C, and possibly the next token. If
neither party has cheated and the next token emitted by the Beacon* contains i,
then both parties are committed to the contract at the' same time. If the next
emitted token does not contain ¿, then neither parties are committed and steps
3 to 7 have to be repeated. Rabin showed that in such an exchange there is a
probability of 1/N that one of the parties could cheat successfully.

4

Beacons

Rabin's novel ideas on the use of beacons have been largely overlooked by the
research community during the past decade. We revive these ideas by transferring
them to the authentication problem. The following is a more detailed description
of the concept, feasibility and implementation of a Beacon.
A Beacon, within the context of this paper, is a service that is provided
by a secure host in a computer network. The Beacon broadcasts, at regular
intervals, a nonce encapsulated within a certified token. The emitted token would
be accessible to all hosts on the network and each host maintains a short list of
fresh tokens. The additional load caused by this service would be small as each
host is only required to listen for a short and relatively infrequent message.

4.1

Token

The token has the following form:
Ni,time,life,{MAC]xb
where:

Ni
—»• is a freshly generated nonce.
time — i s the time at which the token was emitted.
life
— i s the time after which the token will not be valid.
MAC
is the message authentication code.
^BN
is the Beacon's secret encryption key which is used to certify the token.

Each host which receives the token is able to verify its validity by decrypting
the MAC using the Beacon's public key. The MAC insures that the token has not
been tampered with. Since the token is signed with the Beacon's secret key it is
reasonable to assume the token originated from the Beacon. Each host is able to
maintain, on behalf of its principals, a short list of currently valid tokens. Thus
these tokens are available to all principals to use in the authentication process.
4.2

Network Synchronization

There is reliance within a Beacon based system that each principal has access to
a stable clock and that these clocks are to some extent synchronized. Since the
life of a token can be relatively long, say an hour, differences of a few seconcis
between the hosts can be tolerated. In this section we examine the Internet's
Network Time Protocol (NTP) to show that in fact it is feasible to have much
closer synchronization between communication hosts.
Any attempt to synchronize communicating entities requires access to an
accurate standard. Since 1972 the time standard for the world has been based
on International Atomic Time which is currently maintained to an accuracy of
a few parts in 10^- [14]. Many countries operate standard time and frequency
broadcast stations which collectively cover most areas of the world.
The network time protocol (NTP) is an Internet standard protocol [15] which
is used to maintain a network of time servers, accessible over normal Internet
paths. Even though transmission delays over Internet can vary widely, due to
fluctuations in traflRc loads and dynamic message routing, NTP acts to provide global synchronization. NTP is built on Internet's User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) [16] which provides a connectionless transport mechanism.
The NTP system consists of a network of primary and an estimated total of
over 2000 secondary time servers. Primary time servers are directly synchronized
by reference source, usually a timecode receiver, or a calibrated atomic clock.
Secondary time servers are synchronized by either a primary server or another
secondary time servers. Due to the wide dispersal of these servers, access is
available using some thousands of routes over hundreds of networks, making the
system very reliable.
In a typical configuration used at the University of Illinois and the University
of Delaware, the institutions operate three campus servers. These servers are
synchronized using two primary servers and each other. The three campus servers
in turn provide synchronization for department servers which then deliver time
to remaining hosts. In such a configuration of several hundred synchronization
milliseconds-seconds would not be uncommon.

4.3

Creating a Beacon

As stated above, a Beacon is a service whicli, at regular intervals, emits a token
which can be authenticated. The emitted token must be accessible to all hosts
on the network and each host is required to maintain a short list of fresh tokens.
Since the broadcast is short and relatively infrequent, implementation is quite
feasible in either software or hardware. Algorithm 1 shows the functionality.

Algorithm 1 BeaconQ
1. t = clock + A
2. Ni = GO
3. MACi =
h{t,life,Ni)
4.T =
t,life,Ni,{MACi}xs:.
5. while (clock <t) wait
6. broadcast(T)
7. goto(l)
end

The algorithm begins by setting, Z, the time for the next broadcast. Next,
the token is constructed prior to broadcasting (lines 2 to 4). The cryptographically strong pseudo-random generator, G(), is used to create a nonce Ni. The
final component required to create the token is the message authentication code
(MAC). The one-way hash function, h, is employed to compress the bit string
created by the concatenation of the broadcast time, i, the token life, / and the
nonce Ni. The output, which is of a fixed length, is used as the MAC. The token,
T consists of the MAC, MACi, signed with the Beacon's private key and the
other three fields. The token is broadcast at time t (lines 5 and 6). The algorithm
is then repeated (line 7).
4.4

One Use Token

It is generally accepted that the beneficial features of a public key cryptosystem
are bought at the expense of speed. At present it is not feasible to use a public
key system for bulk encryption. In practice, however, it is quite desirable to
create a hybrid system in which a public key system is used for authentication
and distribution of a session key. The session key would then be used by the two
principals to communicate securely using a symmetric key system.
With a Beacon based system, a "one use token" can be used to simplify
the process. By one use token it is meant that a token emitted by the Beacon
can be used only once to obtain service from a particular server; much like an

admission ticket to a theatre. Once the token has been presented, it is marked
and will not be accepted by t h a t server on any subsequent occasion. The process
of marking tokens is much easier for the server than maintaining a database of
prior requests. T h e use of one use tokens eliminates the possibility of a replay
attack and thus simplifies the process.
To illustrate the process consider a very simple case. Alice wishes to communicate securely with Bob. In this case Bob can be thought of as being the
server and Alice the client. Assume, for simplicity, that Alice and Bob communicated yesterday and they are both certain that each knows the other's public
key. Such an occurrence is not uncommon in a distributed system since most
principals communicate within a small group and cache is commonly used to
store commonly used keys. The process hcis two steps:
1. Alice
Bob: Alice,Ni,
{
K
A
,
A
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message in which contains,
her name, the nonce iV,-, and a session key KA,B- The session key is created
by Alice, and will is to be used with a symmetric cryptographic system,
to secure subsequent messages. Since the session key is the secret in the
message, it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's public key, YBThe nonce, A^,-, is select at random by Alice from the list of active tokens
and ensures message freshness. The message integrity is protected using a
MAC which is signed by Alice.
2. Bob => Alice: {Ni -f
1}KA,B
Bob having received the request for communication can confirm that the
message did come from Alice and that it has not been altered. The freshness
of the message is guaranteed by the use of a nonce, Ni, which was recently
broadcast by the Beacon. Since the nonce can be used only once there is
of course a finite probability that the nonce chosen by the Alice from the
active list has already been presented to Bob by someone else. In such a
case the request would be rejected and Alice would have to re-apply with an
other nonce. T h e probability of such a collision occurring is dependent on
factors such as network load, token frequency and token life. In a practical
applications the additional load caused by this effect should be minimal.
Having received a session key which he can trust. Bob completes the protocol
by authenticating himself to Alice. He enciphers the modified nonce with a
session key and sends it to Alice. Since only Bob could have obtained session
key, the message proves Bob's identity.

5

Beacoiiizing the N e e d h a m and Schroeder Protocol

T h e Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol [8] is arguably one of the best known
authentication and key distribution protocols. It has been the basis of a number
of systems t h a t use the nonce to prove freshness. In 1981 Denning and Sacco [9]
pointed out a weakness in the NS protocol and suggested the use of time-stamped
certificates to guard against a replay attack. Since that time authentication

it is meant, the certificates must be valid for a duration of time. The length of the
certificate lifetime would depend on factors such as synchronization discrepancy
between hosts and communication delays. During this period the protocol is
vulnerable to a replay attack. Thus if the certificate lifetime is kept short, the
protocol reduces the likelihood of a replay attack, but it does not eliminate it.
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer able
to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be kept short
to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all conversations.

5.3

A Beacon Based Approach

We now introduce a Beacon to the distributed system and modify the NS protocol to take advantage of the new service. As in the unmodified NS protocol, the
beaconized protocol can be divided into two sections. The first enables a principal to obtain another's public key. The second, the connection protocol, is used
by a principal to initiate a conversation. We end this section by modifying the
connection protocol to include the distribution of a symmetric session key. Once
again we will use the over worked principals, Alice and Bob, to demo\istrate the
protocol features.

Public Key Distribution Protocol
The following are the step required for Alice to obtain Bob's public key.
1. Alice
AS: Alice,Bob
Alice sends a message to the AS stating her name is Alice and requesting
Bob's public key. The message is in plain-text and only contains the two
identities.
2. AS
Alice: Boh.YB, N i , { M A C } x ^ s
Since the reply to Alice contains no secret information, the message is not
enciphered. As in the NS protocol the message contains the requested public
key and the name of the key's owner. This ensures that the request made by
Alice has not been altered. The nonce, Ni, is picked randomly by the Beacon
from the list of active tokens and is used to guarantee that this message is
not a replay. The message integrity is ensured by the M A C which is signed
by the AS.
Since the Beacon based system uses the concept of a "one use token", if Ni
has previously been presented to Alice, then it would have been marked and consequently the AS's reply would be rejected. In such circumstances, Alice would
have to reinitated the request. The probability of such a collision occurring, in
a practical application, is quite low.

Connection Protocol
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain the required keys, the
following is the step required for Alice to initiate a conversation.

1. Alice => Bob:
A\ice,Ni,{MAC}x^
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains her
name and the nonce, Ni. The nonce is selected at random by Alice from the
list of active tokens and is used to ensures message freshness. The message
integrity is protected using a MAC which is signed by Alice. Since the message contains no secret information it is not encrypted with Bob's public
key.
If A^i has previously been presented to Bob, then it would have been marked and
the request for connection would be rejected. In such an event Bob would reply
with an error message and Alice would select another nonce and reinitiate the
request.
Distribution of a Symmetric key.
At present it is not feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption. Thus,
it is quiet desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key system is
used for authentication and distribution of a session key. The session key would
then be used by the two principals to communicate securely using a symmetric
key system. We now modify the protocol to allow the two principals, Alice aaid
Bob, to share a session key.
1. Alice
Bob: Alice,A^i,
Alice would initiate such an exchange by sending Bob a message containing
her nariie, the nonce Ni, and the session key, KA,B- Once again Ni is used
to ensure freshness. Since the session key is the only secret in the message,
it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's public key, V^.The message
integrity is protected using a MAC which is signed by Alice.
5.4

Attacks on the Modified Protocol

The attacks that can be launched against the beaconized protocol can be broken
up in to six categories. In the following section the effects of these are discussed
in turn.
- In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of the
principals in the system. Since the principal's secret key is used to prove its
identity, for such an attack to succeed an adversary would require knowledge
of such a key. If a principal's secret key were to be compromised, it is possible
that an adversary could masquerade as that principal while the problem was
undetected and thus before a new key is distributed. However unlike the NS
protocol, an adversary is unable to block the distribution of new keys.
- By eavesdropping (or monitoring) network traffic, an adversary hopes to gain
some advantage or learn some secret. Since the public key protocol does not
require the transmission of any secret information, such an attack cannot
succeed. In the case of the hybrid system, the session key is encipher. Thus
an adversary would require knowledge of the deciphering key.

- The goal of a Tt-play attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowledge
by retransmitting a message that was intercepted earlier. There are three
distinct areas in which a replay attack could be attempted. They are:
1. The token transmitted by the Beacon. The purpose of this message is to
broadcast a unique token to all hosts on the network. Since the token has
a finite life, if an expired token were retransmitted, the message would
simply be discarded. Replaying the message before the token expires
gains no advantage for the adversary as the duplicate token would be
detected and thus discarded.
2. The second attempt could be made against the public key distribution
portion of the protocol. The protocol consists of two message. The effect
of replaying these would be:
• The protocol is initiated by a principal request another principals
public key. The request is in plain-text and is direct to the AS. Since
the information is public and service is freely available, the adversary
can gain nothing new.
• The reply from the AS contains the requested public key. Since the
message is unique; in that it contains the name of the recipient, a
one use nonce and is signed by the sender, a replayed message would
be detected.
3. The final message that could be replayed is the request for connection.
This message is also unique, thus a replayed message would detect and
the attack would fail.
- A modification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets as they
travel across the computer network. For such an attack to succeed the change
must be undetected. Such an attack would be futile because the recipient of
a message is always able to detect any changes.
- An attempt to delay authentication messages would cause the token to expire
and prevent the principal from completing the authentication process. Such
an attack would have the same results as "denial of service".
- A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary that is able to
hinder communications is some manner. Detection and countering such an
attack is best dealt with by other means such as statistical monitoring of
the network.

6

Discussion on Advantages

In this section we discuss the advantages gained by use of a beaconized approach over the NS protocol or the time base protocol suggested by Denning
and Sacco. Due to constraints on space the discussion has been kept brief and
the presentation of results is left to the full paper.
The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol has been the basis for a number of
systems. The approach taken by them requires principals, wishing to establish
a conversation, to engage in a three step message exchange. The purpose of

this exchange is to ascertain the identity of the other principal and to guard
against a replay attack. The distribution of public keys is provided by a trusted
authentication server, AS. In the worst case, where both principals require the
services of the AS to obtain public keys, the protocol requires a total of seven
messages to be exchanged.
In [9], Denning and Sacco pointed out that the NS protocol is vulnerable to
a replay attack in the event that a principal's key is compromised. To over come
this difficulty, Denning and Sacco suggested the use of time-stamped certificates.
The resulting protocol requires a principal who wishes to initiate a conversation,
to contact the AS to obtain two certificates; one for each principal. Each certificate has a finite life and contains a public key. One benefit of this approach
is that the number of messages required to initiate a conversation is reduced to
three. However, during the period between the certificate being issued and expiring, the modified protocol is also is vulnerable to a replay attack. The protocol
does not eliminate the possibility of a replay attack, but reduces it.
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer able
to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be kept short
to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all conversations.
This means that a greater amount of trust is invested in the AS and the realm
now has a single point of failure.
The fundamental diff"erence between our approach is the use of a Beacon to
deliver a "one use token" to each host. This simplifies the authentication process
by taking advantage of the features of a public key cryptographic system. In
contrast to the modification proposed by Denning and Sacco, the beaconized
approach eliminates the possibility of a replay attack, allows principals to cache
commonly used keys and reduces the role of the AS "key look-up service".

7

Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have attempted to show that the use Beacons can simplify
authentication in a distributed system. The main advantage of our approach
is the elimination of the possibility of a replay attack while maintaining the
minimum level of trust being invested in the "third party authentication server".
This reliance on a trusted agent requires a great deal of trust to be concentrated
at one point, addes to the level of system complexity and reduces flexibility.
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Abstract
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties was first suggested by M.
Rabin in "Transactions protected by beacons", Journal of Computer and System Sciences, Vol
27, pp 256-267, 1983. In this paper we revive Rabin's ideas which have been largely
overlooked in the past decade. In particular we present a novel approach to the authentication
problem based on a service called Beacon which continuously broadcasts certified nonces. We
argue that this approach considerably simplifies the solution to the authentication problem and
we illustrate the impact of such a service by presenting a "Beaconizing" authentication protocol.
The modified protocol would be suitable for deployment at upper layers of the communication
stack.
INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty years the rapid evolution of electronic data communication has been breath
taking. This growth and reliance on electronic communication has increased concern about data
privacy and integrity. Much effort is currendy being devoted to providing security^ services for a
variety of communication environments. Authentication is universally acknowledged as being
essential for secure communications in a distributed information system. Informally,
authentication is the capability of the recipient of a communication to be able to verify that the
message did come from the alleged sender. As a further requirement, it is usual to expect such
systems to perform verification over an open insecure network. This requirement constrains the
authentication system in the following manner:
•

Reliance must not be placed in the physical security of all hosts in the distributed system.

•

It should be assumed that packets travelling along the network can be read, modified and
inserted with littie effort by an adversary.

•

Trust cannot be based on the sender's address.

•

Trust cannot be based on the sender's operating system security.

Currently, the dominant authentication protocols employed in a client-server environment use a
broker to arbitrate between principals who wish to communicate. In such a scheme, a principal
must first contact tiie broker to obtain credentials which can be trusted by its communicating
partner. The protocol will typically rely on an exchange of cryptographic messages and the
participant's knowledge of some secret. Well known examples of such systems are Kerberos
(Steiner et al 1988), KiyptoKnight (Molvai et al 1993) and Kuperee (Hardjono et al 1993).
In this paper we present a novel approach to the authentication problem for a distributed
information system using a public key cryptographic system and we introduce a new service
called Beacon which has been inspired by Rabin (1983). A Beacon broadcasts, at regular
intervals,'certified nonces which are accessible to all hosts within the network. In section 4 we
revive Rabin's novel idea by giving a brief description of his method. In section 5 we provide a
backdrop by describing some of the issues involved in authentication. In the next three sections
we describe the beaconized approach to authentication. Finally we end by describing some of
the advantages of this approach and we make some concluding remarks.

TERMINOLOGY
Throughout this paper certain terms are used that may appear to be ambiguous or new to
readers. In the following section the use of these terms, in the context of this document, are
stated This should avoid any difficulty caused by them being used differently elsewhere.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word nonce to mean "coined for one occasion". In
the context of this paper a nonce is a random number that is freshly generated for
on one
occasion. The random number is generated using a suitable generator and is of sufficient length
to make it infeasible for an adversary to produce i t
A host is a computer with a unique address that is connected to a computer network.
The user is the human being who is using some services that are provided by the network. J^
programs in the system are initiated by users. The main purpose of authentication is to verify
the identity of the users within a network.
A client is a program that runs on behalf of a user in order to request some service that is
available on a remote host Since the client runs on a user's behalf, it assumes the user identity
and privileges. Any action taken by a client is said to have been carried out by the user.
The server is a program that provides a service to a client on the network. It is usually installed
by the system administrator and runs on behalf of the system. A server remains active in a
network for much longer than a client and thus is given an identity. By this it is meant that each
server is registered with the system, in a similar manner to a user, and that it must prove its
identity before a client will accept it
Any communicating network entity, that is client or server, can be referred to as a principal,
A realm is organised in a hierarchical structure and has a strong analogy to domains in Internet
A single authentication server, be it a Beacon or Third-party Authenticator, is responsible for aU
local principals. This coUection of network entities, the auiientication server and its clients, are
referred to as a realm. A client who wishes to obtain some service from a server within the
same realm would use the service to prove its identity.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC REQUIREMENTS
The Beacon based system relies on a public key (or asymmetric) cryptographic system. Many
such systems have been designed and examples of such schemes can be found in (Zheng et al
1992, Rivest et al 1978). For the purpose of our discussions the system's cryptographic
requirements can be simplified and kept generic.
A public key system differsfix)ma secret key (or symmetric) system in that each principal in the
distributed systern has a pair of keys. The calculation of this private and public key pair, given
the initial conditions, is easy. However, it would be infeasible for an adversary who knows a
public key to calculate the secret key or the initial conditions. Each principal has a private key
which is kept secret and is only known to that principal. The corresponding public key is made
available to all other principals. In the remainder of this paper" {
means encipher mth key
"Z". The private and public key pair will be denoted as "X" and "Y" respectively and subscripts
will be used to identify the associated principal. Thus the Beacon would have a key pair XgN.
YgN» the principal, Alice, would have the pair X^, Yp^ while Bob would have Xg, Yg.
The advantage of a public key system is that it supports secrecy, authentication, and integrity.
Communication secrecy is supported by the transformations: M = { { M } y „
That is,
B
B
suppose Alice wishes to send a secret message, M, to Bob. Then Alice must have access to
Bob's public key and encipher the message, as: C = { M lyg-Alice sends Bob the
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cryptographic string C. On receipt Bob is able to employ his private key to decipher the
message.Thus {C Ix^ = { { M ly^ Ix^ = M.
The encryption and decryption processes are easy using the appropriate keys. However, it
would be infeasible for an adversary to decipher C without the private key Xg, ensuring
secrecy. Now, since Yg is publicly known. Bob has no way of being certain of the sender's
identity. Thus authenticity has not been assured using this method.
Authentication, using a public key system, is satisfied by the following transformation, thus
M = { { M ) xPi.. l y AA • Alice is able to "sign" her message to Bob by using her private key, X^,
so C = { M }x..
Bob is able to verify that the message could have only come from Alice by
Pi.
deciphering the message using Alice's public key, Yy^, as: {C }yPi. = {{ M}x.A }y.
A. = M. If the
message is plain-text. Bob knows that C has in fact not been altered. However, if the message,
or any portion of the message, is a random string then it may be difficult for Bob to ascertain
that the message has not been altered merely by examining it. For this reason it is more usual
for Alice to employ a suitable one-way hashing function (eg. Rivest 1992, Zheng et al 1993) to
produce a Message Authentication Code (MAC). Alice would sign the MAC with her private
key and append it to the message. On receiving the message. Bob is able to reproduce the MAC
in order to confirm that the message is from Alice and that it has not been altered. Finally, all
three can be employed by Alice to communicate securely with Bob thus:
C={M,{MAC}x^}y3.
RABIN S APPROACH USING BEACONS
The use of a Beacon as a security service within a distributed computer system was first
suggested by M. Rabin (1983). He defined a Beacon as emitting, at regular interval, a random
integer sealed using a suitable cryptographic signature system. The integer would be selected
randomly and uniformly within the range 1 to N, where N is publicly known. With this basic
concept he proposed two protocols based on a probabilistic approach, one for the signing of
contracts and the second for infoimation disclosure. In the following section Rabin's use of
Beacons is illustrated by briefly outlining the contract signing protocol. For a full account, the
reader is referred to the original paper.
Contract Signing Using a Beacon
Consider, Alice and Bob have negotiated a contract over a computer network and are ready to
exchange signed copies. It is not possible for them to meet and they wish using the network to
exchange electronically. We can assume that the contracts can be signed by an suitable
electronic signature scheme. The problem addressed by Rabin was, if Alice signs and sends the
contract to Bob, then Alice is committed, but Bob is not. Bob could take the opportunity to look
for a better deal, leaving Alice vulnerable. A similar argument can be made about Bob.
In Rabin's protocol we can assume the following initial conditions:
Each of the participants has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair which can be used for
signing messages and verifying signatures. The Beacon has the private and public key
pair XbN' YbN' Alice's keys are Xa, Ya and Bob's are Xb, Yb- The public keys, Ybn,
Ya and Yb are widely known and are available to the participants. Each participant's
private key has been kept secret and is known only to its owner.
The Beacon broadcasts a token, T every A seconds and the next broadcast will be at time t
+ A. The token, T, has the following foim: T = { t, i Ixbn' ^^^^^ ^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^^^
the token was emitted and i is a randomly selected integer between 1 and N. The value of
N is publicly known. The Beacon seals the token using its private key Xbn-

Alice and Bob have agreed to the contract name, C, such that: C = h(contract) where a
suitable hash function h is applied to the text of the contract and the obtained result is used
to denote the contract
•

Alice and Bob have agreed and signed preliminary agreements. We will refer to ±ese
agreements signed by Alice and Bob as PA and PB respectively. The text of PA is as
follows:
{ If Bob can produce {CJJxj^ and (TJx^^M
some token T, then I, Alice will be
committed to the contract as of the time t mentioned in the token T
Bob signs a similar contract with the name Alice and Bob exchanged. Since this
agreement does not bind either parties to the contract, it reasonable to assume that this
initial exchange will pass off without incident

The protocol for the exchange of contracts requires that both parties follow a timed sequence.
The exchange is aborted if one party fails to transmit the specified message within the allocated
time. The exchange takes place in the time between Beacon broadcasts. This time A is divided
in six equal segments. The protocol is as follows:
1. t < time < t + A/6

Alice Bob: PA

2.

Bob Alice: PB

3. t + A/6 < time <t +A/3

Alice Bob: ÍA

4.
5.

Bob
ÍB N
i = íaAlice:
+ ifi n^od

t + A/3>time < t + A/2

6. t + A/2< time < t + 2A/3
7.

Alice Bob: {C,i,t+
Bob Alice:{C,i,t+

Within the first segment (steps 1 and 2) the two parties are required to exchange the preliminary
contract. In the next two segments both Alice and Bob exchange random number that each has
generated independently, that is ÍA and ÍB- Each party is then able to calculate i. Last, (steps 6
and 7) the two parties sign and exchange the messages that could bind them to the contract
These messages contain the contract name, C, and possibly the next token. If neither party has
cheated andtiiienext token emitted by the Beacon contains i, then both parties are committed to
the contract at the same time. If the next emitted token does not contain i, then neither parties are
committed and steps 3 to 7 have to be repeated. Rabin showed that in such an exchange there is
a probability of 1/N that one of the parties could cheat successfully.
THE AUTHENTICATION PROBLEM
In a distributed system the need to promote trust between principals that are physically separate
is fundamental. The basis of this trust is the ability of principals to authenticate messages it
receives. In this section we will consider some of the issues involved in authentication. We will
base our discussion on the well known public key protocol proposed by Needham and
Schroeder (1978) and it's modification in Denning and Sacco (1981).
Authentication Server
An authentication server (AS) is used as a broker who can provide a common point of trust for
two principals wishing to communicate. Each principal with a realm which is dominated by a
particular AS, is required to register his or her public key with that AS. To establish trust

between principals within a realm, the AS must have the trust of all principals within its realm,
so as to be able to maintain and distribute these keys reliably.
(a) Needham and Schroeder Protocol
In the Needham and Schroeder Protocol the role of the As is to distribute the public keys of
principals within its realm. A principal can apply to the AS for the public key of another
principal and thus the key obtained can be trusted. Consider the situation where Alice wishes to
communicate with Bob. If she is not certain of Bob's public key, she must first apply to the AS
to obtain Bob's public key. The steps required are as follows:
1.

Alice => AS: Alice, Bob
Alice sends a message to the AS requesting the public key. The requesting message is in
clear text and contains the names of both principals.

2.

AS
Alice: {Bob, YB 1x^3
The AS responds with a message containing the requested public key and is signed with
the AS's private key. The message contains the name of the key's owner which allows
Alice to verify that the reply contains the correct key.
This exchange (steps 1 and 2) does not by itself provide any assurance that the request
was initiated by Alice or the freshness of the AS's reply.
''

3.

Alice => Bob: {Na, Alice}Yg
Alice is able to initiate the authentication process by sending Bob a message which
contains a nonce, Nys^, and her identity. The message is enciphered with Bob's public
key, YB, which means only Bob will be able to access N/^.

4.

Bob
Alice: {NA,NB}Y^
On receiving the message, Bob requires Alice's public key in order to obtain the nonce
N/^. If Bob does not have the key in his cache of frequently used keys then he must
obtain it from the AS (see steps 1 and 2).
Once Bob has obtained N^, he still cannot be certain of freshness nor who is the actual
sender. To verify identity and guard against a replay attack. Bob generates a nonce, NB,
and sends it to Alice. Bob proves his identity to Alice by including N^ in the reply. The
message to Alice is encrypted with Alice's public key.

5.

Alice =i> Bob: {NBIYB
As a final step in this authentication process, Alice proves her identity to Bob by returning
NB-

Even if both principals were certain of the other's public key, the step authentication
process (steps 3,4 and 5) is still required to ensure freshness and guard against a replay
attack.
Message Freshness
(a) Protocol Weakness
Denning and Sacco (1981) analysed the protocol and pointed out that it is only secure while
there hasn't been a key compromise. They showed that in the event of a compromise the
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protocol is no longer secure. To examine the weakness let us suppose that an adversary,
Charles, has managed to obtain Alice's private key. Also he has been able to record past
conversations between the AS, Bob and Alice. Charles is able to use these to maintain
confidence in Alice's public key. He does this by replaying an old response by the AS to a
request for Alice's public key. The replay of course distributes the compromised key. To
illustrate, the following showis how Charles is able to trick Bob.
1.

Bob => AS: Bob, Alice
Bob send s a message to AS requesting Alice's public key.

Charles => Bob: {Alice, ^^AIX^S
Charles intercepts the message and replies to the request by replaying an old key
distribution message. Since the reply is signed by the AS, Bob is tricked into accepting
the message and thus the compromised key Yp^.
Since the key distribution message never expires and does not contain the name of the
requesting principal, Charles will be able to trick any principal within the realm until the AS
changes its key pair. Not only is Charles able to masquerade as Alice but also by blocking the
distribution of her key, he can deny her any service he chooses.
(b) Denning and Sacco's Modification
^
The solution suggested by Denning and Sacco uses time stamped certificates. The fonn of these
certificates is as follows:
Ao
where: P is the principal's identification.
Yp is the public key belonging to principal P.
T is the time at which the certificate was issued.
X^s is the AS's private key which is used to sign the certificate.
The Denning and Sacco modified protocol combines the authentication and key distribution into
a single process. That is, if the principals are able to obtain public keys reliably and message
freshness can be guaranteed, then the communicating principals are able to use the features of
their public key cryptographic system to authenticate messages. The step of the modified
protocol are as follows:

2.

1. Alice AS: Alice, Bob
As before Alice sends a message to the AS. The message requests two certificates, one
containing Bob's public key and the other containing Alice's public key.
2. AS Alice: Ca, Cg
The AS responds with a message containing two signed certificates. C^ contains Alice's
public key and Cg contains Bob's.
3.

Alice =>Bob:CA,CB
Alice initiate the conversation with Bob by sending the certificates. Since the certificates
are signed by the AS and contain the time-stamp to prove freshness. Bob is able to trust
them.
Denning and Sacco pointed out that in order for Alice to obtain the certificate and deliver them
to Bob, the certificates must have a lifetime. By this it is meant, the certificates must be valid for
a duration of time. The length of the certificate lifetime would depend on factors such as
synchronisation discrepancy between hosts and communication delays. During this period the

protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack. Thus if the certificate lifetime is kept short, the protocol
reduces the likelihood of a replay attack, but it does not eliminate it
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer able to cache commonly
used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be kept short to minimise the risk of a replay
attack, the AS must initiate all conversation.
BEACONS
Rabin's novel ideas on the use of beacons have been largely overlooked by the research
community during the past decade. We revive these ideas by transferring them to the
authentication problem. The following is a more detailed description of the concept, feasibility
and implementation of a Beacon.
A Beacon, within the context of this paper, is a service that is provided by a secure host in a
computer network. The Beacon broadcasts, at regular intervals, a nonce encapsulated within a
certified token. The emitted token would be accessible to all hosts on the network and each
host maintains a short list of fresh tokens. The additional load caused by this service would be
small as each host is only required to listen for a short and relatively infrequent message.
Token
The token has the following form: Ni,time,life,{MAC}xgj^, where Nj is a freshly generated
nonce; time is the time at which the token was emitted; life is the time after which the token will
not be valid; MAC is the message authentication code; Xg^ is the Beacon's secret encryption
key which is used to certify the token.
Each host which receives the token is able to verify its validity by decrypting the MAC using
the Beacon's public key. The MAC insures that the token has not been tampered with. Since the
token is signed with the Beacon's secret key it is reasonable to assume the token originated
from the Beacon. Each host is able to maintain, on behalf of its principals, a short list of
currently valid tokens. Thus these tokens are available to all principals to use in the
authentication process.
Network Synchronisation
There is reliance within a Beacon based system that each principal has access to a stable clock
and that these clocks are to some extent synchronised. Since the life of a token can be relatively
long, say an hour, differences of a few seconds between the hosts can be tolerated. In this
section we examine the Internet's Network Time Protocol (NTP) to show that in fact it is
feasible to have much closer synchronisation between communication hosts.
In a typical configuration used at the University of Illinois and the University of Delaware, the
institutions operate three campus servers. These servers are synchronised using two primary
servers and each other. The three campus servers in turn provide synchronisation for
department servers which then deliver time to remaining hosts. In such a configuration of
several hundi^d synchronisation milliseconds-seconds would not be uncommon.
Creating a Beacon
As stated above, a Beacon is a service which, at regular intervals, emits a token which can be
authenticated. The emitted token must be accessible to all hosts on the network and each host is
required to maintain a short list of fresh tokens. Since the broadcast is short and relatively
infrequent, implementation is quite feasible in either software or hardware. The following
algorithm shows the functionality.

1.
2.
3.
4.

t = system_clock + A
Ni = G()
MACi = h(t,life,Ni)
T = t, life, Nj, { M A Q Ixgj^

5.
6.
7.

while (clock < t) wait()
broadcast( T )
goto(step 1)

The algorithm begins by setting, t, the time for the next broadcast. Next, the token is
constructed prior to broadcasting (steps 2 to 4). The cryptographically strong pseudo-random
generator, GQ, is used to create a nonce Nj. The final component required to create the token is
the message authentication code (MAC). The one-way hash function, h, is employed to
compress the bit string created by the concatenation of the broadcast time, t, the token life, 1 and
the nonce Nj. The output, which is of a fixed length, is used as the MAC. The token, T
consists of the MAC, MACi, signed with the Beacon's private key and the other three fields.
The token is broadcast at time t (steps 5 and 6). The algorithm is then repeated (step 7).
One-time Token
With a Beacon based system, a "One-time token" can be used to simplify the process. By Onetime token it is meant that a token emitted by the Beacon can be used only once to obtain service
from a particular server; much like an admission ticket to a theatre. Once the token has been
presented, it is marked and will not be accepted by that server on any subsequent occasion. The
process of marking tokens is much easier for the server than maintaining a database of prior
requests. The use of One-time tokens eliminates the possibility of a replay attack and thus
simplifies the process.
A BEACON BASED APPROACH
We now introduce a Beacon to the distributed system and present an authentication protocol that
takes advantage of the new service. The beaconized protocol can be divided into two sections.
The first enables a principal to obtain another's public key. The second, the connection
protocol, is used by a principal to initiate a conversation. We end this section by modifying the
connection protocol to include the distribution of a symmetric session key. Once again we will
use the over worked principals, Alice and Bob, to demonstrate the protocol features.
Public Key Distribution Protocol
The following are the step required for Alice to obtain Bob's public key.
1.

Alice
AS: Alice,Bob
Alice sends a message to the AS stating her name is Alice and requesting Bob's public
key. The message is in plain-text and only contains the two identities.

2.

AS => AHce: Bob,YB, N i , { M A C } x . .
_^

JK.O

Since the reply to Alice contains no secret information, die message is not enciphered. As
in the NS protocol the message contains the requested public key and the name of the
key's owner. This ensures that the request made by Alice has not been altered. The
nonce, Nj, is picked randomly by the Beacon from the list of active tokens and is used to
guarantee that this message is not a replay. The message integrity is ensured by the MAC
which is signed by the AS.
Since the Beacon based system uses the concept of a "One-time token", if Nj has previously
been presented to Alice, then it would have been marked and consequently the AS's reply

would be rejected. In such circumstances, Alice would have to reinitated the request. The
probability of such a collision occurring, in a practical application, is quite low.
Connection Protocol
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain the required keys, the following is the step
required for Alice to initiate a conversation.
1.

Alice
Bob: Alice,Ni,{MAC}x
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains her name and the
nonce, Nj. The nonce is selected at random by Alice from the list of active tokens and is
used to enpres message freshness. The message integrity is protected using a MAC
which is signed by Alice. Since the message contains no secret information it is not
encrypted with Bob's public key.

If Nj has previously been presented to Bob, then it would have been marked and the request for
connection would be rejected. In such an event Bob would reply with an error message and
Alice would select another nonce and reinitiate the request.
Distribution of a Symmetric key
At present it is not feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption. Tl>us, it is quiet
desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key system is used for authentication and
distribution of a session key. The session key would then be used by the two principals to
communicate securely using a symmetric key system. We now modify the protocol to allow the
two principals, Alice and Bob, to share a session key.
1.

Alice => Bob: Alice,Ni,{KA,B}YT5'{^^^}XA
o
A
Alice would initiate such an exchange by sending Bob a message containing her name,
the nonce Nj, and the session key, K^^b- Once again Nj is used to ensure freshness.
Since the session key is the only secret in the message, it is the only part that is
enciphered with Bob's public key, Yg. The message integrity is protected using a MAC
which is signed by Alice.

ATTACKS ON THE MODIFIED PROTOCOL
The attacks that can be launched against the beaconized protocol can be broken up in to six
categories. In the following section the effects of these are discussed in turn.
1.

In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of the principals in the
system. Since the principal's secret key is used to prove its identity, for such an attack to
succeed an adversary would require knowledge of such a key. If a principal's secret key
were to be compromised, it is possible that an adversary could masquerade as that
principal while the problem was undetected and thus before a new key is distributed.
However unlike the NS protocol, an adversary is unable to block the distribution of new
keys.

2.

By eavesdropping (or monitoring) network traffic, an adversary hopes to gain some
advantage or learn some secret. Since the public key protocol does not require the
transmission of any secret information, such an attack cannot succeed. In the case of the
hybrid system, the session key is encipher. Thus an adversary would require knowledge
of the deciphering key.

3.

The goal of a replay attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowledge by
retransmitting a message that was intercepted earlier. There are three distinct areas in
which a replay attack could be attempted. They are:
i.

The token transmitted by the Beacon. The puipose of this message is to broadcast a
unique token to all hosts on the network. Since the token has a finite life, if an
expired token were retransmitted, the message would simply be discarded.
Replaying the message before the token expires gains no advantage for the
adversary as the duplicate token would be detected and thus discarded.

ii.

The second attempt could be made against the public key distribution portion of the
protocol. The protocol consists of two message. The effect of replaying these
would be:

iii.

a.

The protocol is initiated by a principal request another principals public key.
The request is in plain-text and is direct to the AS. Since the information is
public and service is freely available, the adversary can gain nothing new.

b.

The reply from the AS contains the requested public key. Since the message is
unique; in that it contains the name of the recipient, a one use nonce and is
signed by the sender, a replayed message would be detected.

The final message that could be replayed is the request for connection. This
message is also unique, thus a replayed message would be detect and the attack
would fail.

4.

A modification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets as they travel across
the computer network. For such an attack to succeed the change must be undetected. Such
an attack would be futile because the recipient of a message is always able to detect any
changes.

5.

An attempt to delay authentication messages would cause the token to expire and prevent
the principal from completing the authentication process. Such an attack would have the
same results as "denial of service".

6.

A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary that is able to hinder
communications is some manner. Detection and countering such an attack is best dealt
with by other means such as statistical monitoring of the network.

DISCUSSION ON ADVANTAGES
In this section we discuss the five main advantages gained by the use of a beaconized approach.
We will contract the approach with those in (Needham et al 1978) and QDenning et al 1981).
The beaconized approach requires fewer steps for principals to establish a connection. The
approach taken by Needham and Schroeder (NS) requires between three and seven steps
for two piincipals to establish a connection. In Denning and Sacco (DS) modified protocol
three steps are required. The beaconized protocol requires one step if both principal have
cached the required keys. The procedure for a principal to acquire the public key of a
communicating partner requires two steps.
The beaconized protocol eliminates the possibility of a replay attack. The same cannot be
said of the either of the two protocols.
•

Unlike the DS protocol, the beaconized approach allows principals to cache commonly
used keys.

•

Unlike the DS protocol^the beaconized approach keeps the role of the AS to simply the
distribution of public keys.

•

Unlike the NS protocol, the beaconized approach does no require each principal to have
the ability to generate nonces.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have attempted to show that the use Beacons can simplify authentication in a
distributed system. The main advantage of our approach is the elimination of the possibility of
a replay attack while maintaining the minimum level of trust being invested in the "third party
authentication server". This reliance on a trusted agent requires a great deal of trust to be
concentrated at one point, adds to the level of system complexity and reduces flexibility.
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